Showing posts with label Political Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Political Economy. Show all posts

6 Mar 2020

Feel the Bern

Hello readers!

Today, I’m going to discuss a topic I usually can’t be bothered with: American politics. As a card-carrying European, what goes on the other side of the pond doesn’t really affect me, so why pay attention? Well, I’m going to make an exception this time—I think the Democratic nomination is really interesting. More importantly, it could have wider relevance for how left-wing parties win (or lose) against populist right-wing opponents.

Also, I have a different perspective because I’m not American; this can give me valuable insights that are missing in the debate. I’ve been treated by the NHS, to take just one example.

I’m going to structure this post into two parts: the first is an overview of the personalities, the second is about tactics. I’ll finish by discussing the issues in my conclusion. Why not put the issues front-and-centre, you ask? Well, it’s because the American Presidency is fundamentally a personality contest. You can’t win an election without understanding this fact.

The Personalities

I’m going to classify the candidates based on Donald Trump’s nicknames. I have no love for Darth Cheetoh (as some affectionately call him) but Trump is a very effective rhetorician who speaks straight from the gut. His ability to nail a politicial opponent’s weaknesses—and to embody the spirit of Middle America—is remarkable.

I’ll discuss the candidates who have had sizeable votes; I’ll ignore the non-entities like Steyer, Yang etc.

“Sleepy Joe”: I think Democrats are making a big mistake voting for this guy. I mean, I like him, and Biden is a likeable guy. But he has several critical flaws that make him a poor choice to fight Donald Trump in 2020. Firstly, he shows worrying signs of senility: he mixes up his wife with his sister, doesn’t know what state he’s in, thinks he’s running for the Senate, and said 150 million Americans were killed by gun violence. (That’s half the population.)

On top of that, he is an establishment politician implicated in the Ukraine debacle. I don’t care about the details; voters won’t either. Trump proved how good he is at eviscerating establishment politicians with Hillary Clinton. “Crooked Clinton” cost Democrats the White House, and “Sleepy Joe” might do the same in 2020.

“Mini Mike”: Only one candidate is worse than Biden against Trump, and it’s this guy. Seriously, what the hell are Democrats thinking? Never mind that progressives won’t vote for a groping billionaire. Trump is a groping billionaire himself, and as such, he intimately understands Bloomberg’s weaknesses. Faced with two billionaires, voters will pick the more charismatic of the two.

“Crazy Bernie”: Why isn’t Bernie the front-runner anymore? What are Democrats thinking? Bernie Sanders would wipe the floor with Trump. He is a brilliant grassroots campaigner; he has the money; and most importantly, people like him. He’s honest and authentic and wins people over to his side. Americans think socialism is crazy—but they agree with public healthcare, and they want college to be cheaper. The more they listen to Sanders, the more reasonable he seems.

“Mayor Pete”: Also known as BOOT EDGE EDGE. I liked him a lot—it was really promising to see a gay candidate come out of nowhere and do so well. I think Pete might have won against Trump, despite the handicap of homophobia. (It’s also interesting that Trump respected a gay man as his political opponent.)

I actually think lack of minority support was a much bigger problem for him. The lack of Black support was his own damn fault—he made some mistakes as mayor of South Bend. But I think he could, in the future, gain lots of support from Latinos; he just needs to reach out and campaign better.

It’s wonderful to think this man could plausibly have become President of the United States.

“The Phoney Pocahontas” aka Elizabeth Warren: A smart woman and a brilliant policymaker, but not a good presidential candidate against Trump. The fabricated stories about her Native American ancestry (debunked by a Cherokee genealogist) is exactly the kind of identity politics that would cost her an election. I’m glad she’s dropped out, and hope she will continue to make a difference in politics.

Tactics

Let’s talk about electability. I think Bernie Sanders is more likely to win than Biden. It’s not impossible that Biden could beat Trump, mind you, but they odds are definitely in Bernie’s favour.

Why? It boils down to two things. Obviously, Sanders can get the base out (this has been discussed ad nauseam). But perhaps more importantly, he can win back Trump–Obama voters, which data shows is the reason Clinton lost the election. He can do this by appealing to them—through his policies, through the kind of person he is—and not playing identity politics.

The data shows that racial anxiety was the reason these voters supported Trump (a “whitelash”). But since these people voted a black man for President (twice!), I hardly think Democrats should give up on them. If the left makes a positive, optimistic case for their vision of America, these voters will come back. If Democrats attack them as racist, and bite Trump’s bait, they will lose.

But how does Bernie win the nomination? The Democratic establishment has rallied around Biden. The good news is that Warren has dropped out, and I’m hoping she will formally endorse Bernie Sanders. If it takes a VP ticket or a seat on a committee, so be it. Bernie and Liz need to stick together.

I want to briefly touch on why the Democratic establishment is so keen to support Biden, despite some pretty obvious flaws. I think it boils down to two things;

  1. (This is the theory I lean towards) They’re desperate. People who are desperate, in my experience, don’t think rationally.
  2. They want to lose with Biden rather than win with Bernie, as the latter option means they lose control of the institution (the Democratic party). Psychologists who study organisations often note this kind of behaviour.

Bernie needs to show Biden’s weakness. “If Joe can’t win a debate against me, how can he beat Donald Trump?” This is is the question Bernie needs to ask voters. He doesn’t have to be aggressive, mind you; Sleepy Joe is like a deer in the headlights anyway.

Conclusion

Two questions are important in the Democratic contest. The first is: “What’s the answer to Trump?” The second is: “How does America get public healthcare?” In both cases, the answer is vote Bernie Sanders.

Pete Buttigieg made a huge mistake in turning away from the single-payer model. He asked what would happen to the 150 million Americans who have private healthcare via their employers. The answer is that all 300 million Americans would be covered under an American NHS, and they won’t have to pay out-of-pocket, and they won’t lose healthcare along with their job. (The German model that Pete proposed would be certainly an improvement over the present system, but it’s still second best. When has America ever settled for second-best?)

If Bernie Sanders makes the case for Biden’s poor electability, and champions in his Medicare-for-all policy, he might still win. I for one think it’s time to “Feel the Bern”.

13 Dec 2019

Comments on the Election

Hello readers!

As of this morning, Friday the 13th, the UK General Election 2019 results have been declared. This post will be separated into multiple parts, to account for my predictions before the campaign (spoiler: I was right); to the result here in Scotland; and to the reality in England, and what it will mean for the future. I aim to provide a preliminary analysis of why the results turned out as they did, though we will need more in-depth data to uncover some of the mysteries.

My Predictions

In this post written six weeks before the election, I made three concrete predictions, and raised the point that the NHS would be a major part of the election campaign. The polls agree that, besides Brexit, the NHS was indeed a big part of voters’ concerns.

As for my three predictions, I was correct on all of them, though some were more prescient than others.

Claim 1: “I don’t think the Liberal Democrats are going to do as well its leader, Jo Swinson, hopes.”

This proved fantastically accurate, or dare I say, prophetic. It’s true that the Liberal Democrat vote increased 7.4% to 11.5%, but this did nothing other than gift seats to the Tories. Jo Swinson lost her seat, confirming what I thought and what the polls were saying: no one likes Jo Swinson.

Moreover, judging from the campaign, Jo Swinson’s Lib Dems lost for the exact reasons I predicted: their revoke policy was undemocratic, and a large number of Remain voters (especially we, the young) care about the NHS, education and welfare. Jo Swinson’s record in coalition was less than stellar on those counts.

Claim 2: “the Green Party will do pretty well, though it probably won’t gain any new seats.”

This was precisely correct: the Green vote increased from 1.6% to 2.7% and they retained their 1 seat. The high profile of environmental issues in the media helped them. I should say that Labour would have won some more seats if the Greens had stood down in some constituencies, but hey, who cares about Brexit if we can pretend to save the planet?

Claim 3: “The Conservative Party will be punished hard in Scotland.”

This one turned out to be mostly correct. The Scottish Tories lost 7 of their 13 seats, and their vote share decreased by 3.5%. I was hoping for a wipe-out, but I’m sure my fellow SNP activists are happy with the result.

As for why the Scottish Tories got 25% of the vote, I’ve tried to understand it, and I’ve come to the following conclusion. About half of Scottish Tory voters do see Boris Johnson’s policies on the economy and NHS as being pretty despicable. I think they justify voting for the Tories with the idea that those policies can be fixed, whereas the breakup of the UK—and exit from the EU—are permanent decisions.

The thing with identities is that they are powerful. Unionists in Scotland believe they are British, and it’s incredibly difficult for them to give that up; they will vote to keep it, even if it means enormous child poverty, homelessness, and decimating the NHS.

What will happen to Scotland?

In one word: Independence. In two words: EU membership. The long, in-depth explanation is going to be too complicated to discuss here. The road to independence will be long, hard, and treacherous. An almighty confrontation between the Scottish government and the Tory government in Westminster will be just the start.

I wish I could be optimistic and say that everything will be alright for Scotland. I think it will—in the future. But the next couple of years are going to be chaotic and uncertain. The double whammy of Tory government and Brexit is going to devastate this country.

What happened in England?

I don’t need to tell you this: Corbyn lost and BoJo’s Tories won. But you know who also lost? England, as a nation. British democracy. Rational thought and truth.

As for why this happened, I’m not sure yet. There are many obvious answers: the antisemitism debacle which was parroted by the media ad infinitum—and which Corbyn would have nipped in the bud long ago, if he had any sense. It’s true that the media coverage was pathetic, and incredibly hostile to Labour; but that doesn’t excuse Corbyn for giving them ammunition.

Then there’s Corbyn himself, who could not get across to the electorate like he did in 2017. But hey, I predicted this long ago. I loved most of Jeremy Corbyn’s policies, but I was always sceptical of the man himself; I called him “less than prime-ministerly” and pithily remarked: “Corbyn? Get a tie.”

I was hoping the young were going to save Labour the same way they did last time, particularly since 1.5 million people registered to vote. Source I don’t know what the hell happened. Did the young vote for the Lib Dems and Greens in a grand act of irony? Did we not come out to vote on polling day? Or was it simply not enough to outvote the bloody pensioners and turkeys?

All of this pales in comparison to the biggest reason for why the Tories won the election: “Get Brexit done.” As John Crace has remarked, this was the biggest lie of the election—and it will cost the English dearly. Look, English voters: the Brexit paralysis we have experienced for the past three years has not been because the Tories didn’t have a majority in Parliament. It’s because Brexit is complicated, difficult, and costly.

The media has encouraged this foolish, self-regarding stupidity. Brexit isn’t hard because British Remainers don’t want it. It’s hard because I, along with the 440 million people in Continental Europe, aren’t going to hand your unicorn on a silver platter. Neither will Trump’s America or China. We have our own interests and we are going to protect them.

I repeat: you are not a world power anymore. If you try and force a deal, you will get nothing, and your economy will implode.

I’m going to abandon my normally calm, rational tone and say it like it is. If you voted Tory, you’ve fucked the young. You’ve fucked the disabled, the homeless, and the people on low pay. You put a noose around the neck of the NHS. Don’t come begging to me when Brexit screws you over; I told you so.

25 Sept 2019

Intermezzo: The Stupor of Brexit

Hail readers!

Following on from my previous post—that Fallen Love is coming out in December—I can provide you with a short update. I am due to meet with my marketing consultant tomorrow, for my first hour of consultation. Fingers crossed! As for my designer, he is on a trip and will return to work on Monday.

In the meanwhile, I am writing another post, on the subject of the title: Brexit. I will attempt to keep this brief, on account of two things. Firstly, I do not wish to distract too much from the main content of this blog. Secondly, because I fear that a lengthier entry would be a rant as opposed to a rational précis.

Let’s start with the title, shall we? Why the word “stupor”, which the Oxford dictionary defines as “a state of near unconsciousness or insensibility”? There are a million other words I could have used to similar effect: stupidity, insanity, pandemonium, et cetera ad infinitum. The answer is simple—the word most accurately describes the state of the electorate. Not the media or Parliament, mind you; the aforementioned words are appropriate there.

This is an observation I have made while living in Glasgow for the past month. To put it quite bluntly, I do not believe that the electorate actually understands the precariousness of this country’s position. Even the most devoted Remain campaigners have either gone into shock, or have been distracted by other, far less important issues.

I was particularly amused by the climate protests here in Glasgow, which drew a sizeable crowd; a police helicopter and several ambulances; and filled up a square. Readers should not make the mistake of thinking I’m downplaying climate change. Climate change is one of the biggest global issues of the 21st century; it will require a fundamental change in our industry, economy, and livelihoods—it will be a second Industrial Revolution.

But climate change is a global issue, and it will require decades to make these transformations a reality. This country is about to leave the European Union in one month without a deal. Protesting about climate change is like complaining in a burning house—it’s true that erosion from the seafront will make the property collapse in about 100 years, but the house is on fire, right now.

The government’s own documents for No-Deal planning, named Operation Yellowhammer, spells out the inferno in detail. To take but a few examples: medicine shortages; chaos on the motorways; food shortages; and riots. They should also add, to that list, economic implosion. Trade deals that will evaporate overnight. Exporters will go out of business; multinational companies will move their offices (they are already doing this!); layoffs; and Sterling will be nuked. Inflation will rise to levels not seen since the 1970s.

So why are voters not scared about this? Some are fanatics who will want their Brexit unicorn no matter what, and no amount of expert testimony or evidence will convince them otherwise. But this is a minority. Rather, I have come to believe that the majority of the electorate are simply living in denial. And the reason for this denial has to do with something fundamental in today’s politics.

People do not understand the impact of political decisions. They don’t have the background in economics, law or history to understand. Not until something happens—the moment those political decisions start to affect their lives.

I fear that by the time the majority wakes up, it will already be too late. On a personal level, this has two effects. Firstly, I am looking for opportunities to get out of this country as soon as possible: an internship placement, a master’s degree, or boarding the flight to Romania on October 31st—the last resort. Secondly, my sympathy has run out.

It’s your fault, Brits. Wake up and smell the burning building. I’m not hanging around to see it burn.

27 Nov 2017

Why Economic Models are Bullshit (Part II)

Hello readers!

Previously, I wrote a post entitled “Why Economic Models are Bullshit (Part I)”. Therein, I covered one of the problematic areas of macroeconomics: namely, that students are badly taught the subject. But that does not tell us enough about the other side of the coin—the reason why macroeconomic models are, by themselves, problematic (aka “bullshit”). In this post, I explain just this.

Before I begin, and in case you are wondering: yes, I am progressing with Fallen Love. I am about halfway through the revision process; I will post an update later on. For the time being, I am extremely busy both with the book and with my university studies. Consider this my final update for the month.

Anyway, onto the topic of today’s post...

The Follies of Macroeconomic Models

I am not the first to criticise an economic model, and in particular, I am not the first to criticise the discipline of economics as a whole. Some critics speak from a position of ignorance; they sometimes make good points, but cannot articulate their criticisms beyond relatively vague generalities. (A few examples: economic models don’t work because you can’t put people in an equation. Or, economics is not a science. Both hold a grain of truth, but are not extended upon beyond platitudes.)

Some critics, however, are economists. Thomas Piketty and Ha-Joon Chang are good examples of the latter, though the venerable Steve Keen is my personal favourite among the rebels. If you have had read these economists, you may detect some of their criticisms among my own; though I quite fancy that I am original. Anyway, vanity is a vice, so allow me to get to the meat of the arguments...

Problem No. 1: economic models are not dynamic. To clarify, by “dynamic” I mean that the models do not explicitly refer to time—either graphically, mathematically, or even in argument. Some economists (especially those who have never done a proper science, like physics or chemistry) seem to think that economic models are dynamic because... time is in there somewhere.

Of course time is present in these models, in some way—they wouldn’t make any sense otherwise. (They make little enough sense as it is!) The problem is that this relationship is dreadfully ambiguous; there is absolutely no clarity about what happens when, and this leads to a number of conceptual errors and oversights.

IS-LM graph

The above graph is a clumsily drawn example, representing an IS–LM model of a small open economy, with e (nominal exchange rate) on the vertical axis and Y (national income) on the horizontal axis. The two sloping lines are IS-curves, while the vertical line is an LM curve. The shift of the IS curve outwards represents a ceteris paribus fall in taxes.

The moral of this story is that, in a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy doesn’t work: you can’t change national income with fiscal policy measures. Even if we assume this is true (there are economists who do not agree with this assessment), the problem is that the graph is extremely obtuse.

There is a whole time dynamic involved here. First, a fall in taxes leads to an increase in Y, which in turn leads to an increase in r (interest rate) as the money supply is fixed. The increase in r leads to a situation where r>r* (the domestic interest rate is higher than the international); this leads to an influx of capital, which in turn drives up the exchange rate e. The appreciation of e leads to a fall in NX, which brings Y back down to the initial Y.

None of that is shown on the graph. We only see a new equilibrium point at e2 and Y. Great explanation there!

Problem No2: economic models confuse cause and effect. If you look at the IS–LM graph aforementioned, you might be forgiven for thinking that somehow Y (national income) affects e (the nominal exchange rate). In the sciences, we put the independent variable on the x-axis, and the dependent variable on the y-axis.

To peruse one of many examples from physics:

Force-extension graph

The story here is pretty straightforward: you apply a force, and the material stretches in a particular way dependent on its material properties.

Occasionally in physics, some graphs don’t follow this convention, usually for reasons of convenience.

The problem is that nearly all economics models have it backwards: they put the independent variable (the causation, the mover) on the Y-axis, and the independent variable (the observed change) on the X-axis. This small change makes economic graphs unnecessarily confusing. In the IS–LM model, e affects Y because e affects NX and Y is dependent on NX; however, there is no clear relationship going the other way round.

In formal logic notation,

(x → y) ≠ (x ↔ y)

This says that (x implies y) is not the same as (x and y imply each other). Or to put it in more comprehensible terms: if I sleep through my alarm I will be late; but if I am late, that doesn’t necessarily mean I slept through my alarm (I could have been stuck in traffic!)

Problem No3: economic models make overly idealised assumptions. This is a big one. Economists say that the art of economic modelling is choosing good assumptions; but if so, economists must be terrible at their job.

Let’s look at the previous model I showed: the IS–LM model under conditions of a small open economy with perfect capital mobility. You may now observe that, actually, well—capital isn’t perfectly mobile. You can’t do a runner with a house. What’s more, houses take time to sell (again, dynamic systems!) and the resale value is not always high (risk element). In many parts of the world, there are restrictions on foreigners buying houses.

Because the assumption of perfect capital mobility is wrong, the aforementioned conclusion is wrong as well. Fiscal policy does have an effect on national income—just look at the UK under austerity. It is thought by many economists that Osborne’s economic policy cost the UK a lot of lost income growth. The Sterling did not depreciate and net exports remained pretty dismal (the former stayed high and the latter stayed negative).

A more useful assumption would have been: assume that some capital assets are mobile while others are not. Determine the share of mobile-assets for the economy you are looking at. This way, you get a much better grasp for what’s actually going on.

Problem No4: vagueness. This is a problem that I have rarely seen mentioned, perhaps because it is of a slightly more philosophical nature. Essentially, what I have noticed in economic models is that they can be quite unclear as to what a concept or variable is referring to.

Take the example of r*, which represents the going interest rate across the globe. Or even just r, which represents the going interest rate in a national economy. My question is: which interest rate does it represent, exactly? Investments have many rates of return. We all know that some investors make a fortune on the stock market; others make a loss. Bonds have different returns based on their maturity period.

If we just take a weighted mean of all these different interest rates, we risk missing some important constituent details.

If we look at the globe, we... observe that there are many interest rates, across both private sector and government investments. Even if we confine ourselves to only government bonds, we see that there are large discrepancies based on the countries’ riskiness (Argentina or South Africa have higher interest rates on their bonds than Germany or the US).

At this point, economists just thought: “Aha! We can model interests rates as being r* + P, where P is the risk premium.”

Except it’s not that simple; the concept of risk premium is itself vague. How do you quantify a risk premium? No one knows. Investors make investment decisions based on their perception of that risk, but the risk itself is uncertain; the interest rate we observe is just the expression of a social belief, not some neat numerical correction.

To put it in philosophical language, the ontological status of the risk premium (and numerous other macroeconomic concepts) is misunderstood. And the consequences are not just philosophical; they can lead to a number of conceptual errors with serious policymaking implications. One prominent example is in neoliberal economics, and its belief in the divine importance of the market price.

In a debate about rent prices in London, the neoliberal economists might say: “All these social housing schemes are nonsense. Why should the state interfere and distort the housing market price?” The use of the word distort is very important—it suggests that the market price is almost like a physical quantity, a reality that should not be meddled with. In reality, of course, the housing prices of London are really just a reflection of the (deluded) expectations of property owners on future prices, among other things.

Problem No5: the role of risk, uncertainty, and expectations. This is another area of economics that is under active research, and in which we are starting to see improvements. I’ve decided not to go detail here; the topic is quite technical, and anyway, I’m doing research on it right now. Perhaps I will cover it in a future post. Until then, I will (again) recommend reading the venerable Steve Keen, along with various other economists such as Frank Knight and Gunnar Myrdal.

Concluding Remarks

What I have written ultimately only scratches the surface; there are much more fundamental questions to be asked about macroeconomics and its ability to accurately model and predict real world economies. Nevertheless, I think the five key problems I have highlighted constitute a good set of methodological problems with macroeconomics—and they are problems that can be feasibly solved.

My conclusion for students, policymakers, and other economists is this: presently, economic models are pretty rubbish. They are in urgent need of improvement—or else economists will find themselves stuck in the credibility crisis they are now in. But better models will demand the work of newer, wiser, and better educated thinkers.

In other words, we need a twin revolution; a revolution in the way we teach economics, to attract stronger students from a wider variety of fields, and a revolution in the way we do economics. Will the field rise up to this challenge? Perhaps. People like Steve Keen give me hope. On the other hand: there are a lot of economists who prefer to keep their head in the sand. What can I say? I hope they die quickly.

10 May 2017

The Battle is Won, but the War Continues

As part of my journalism endeavours, I have written another article on the French elections, this time regarding Macron’s challenges as he enters the Élysée. An excerpt is quoted below; the full link can be found at the bottom.

It would be no understatement to say that Macron’s victory in the second round of the French presidential elections has made EU politicians sigh with relief. His opponent — the Front National candidate — ran on a platform that included taking France out of the euro, calling a referendum on ‘Frexit’, and turning France into a facsimile of the Vichy Régime. Regardless of standard political considerations, Macron’s success was a victory for all decent people throughout Europe; it demonstrated a rebuttal to neofascism and a vote for liberalism, no matter how flawed.

But although the election is over, the war is not. Le Pen will be back again; the populists and their ilk will continue fighting elsewhere in Europe, whether in Austria, Denmark or indeed the UK. It is not enough to merely make the arguments for tolerance and European co-operation. Rather, it is also about convincing the voting public that the answer to our ills — be it employment, security in work, the role of supranational institutions, or tensions with immigrant communities — does not lie in embracing the easy promises of populists or the seductive certainty of hatred.

Read more...

30 Jan 2017

Quelle Président?

Hello readers!

Aujourd’hui Alex will give will his opinion on the French presidential elections. Why, you ask? Because Alex has a strong focus on international and, especially, European politics; and France is a key Member State. The French Président will make decisions regarding the terms of Brexit, the European response to both a revanchist Russia, and to Trump’s America. Moreover, this election is important in symbolic ways; it will give us a taste of 2017 and what it will mean for the forces of liberalism, conservatism, Marxism, and far-right nationalism.

So who is competing to become president of the République? The character cast comprises the following: a fascist, the male re-incarnation of Margaret Thatcher, two mad leftists (a post-scarcity utopian and a Marxist, respectively)... oh, and Tony Blair.

Well, not quite; this Tony Blair is French, for one. And although Blair did have fond feelings for the French—he addressed the country in French, and was given a very cordial greeting by the UMP—he was never, well, French.

Anyway, the man’s name is Emmanuel Macron. He was an investment banker before becoming an adviser for Hollande (the current president, if any of you don’t know); he was then subsequently promoted to being a Minister for the economy. But now, seeing how dismally unpopular the current president is, he’s decided to jump ship and form his own campaign (“En Marche!”).

As for the others, let me give you a quick rundown. We have Marine Le Pen, who is likely to obtain the largest number of first-round votes. She is the daughter of a fascist, and is of course a fascist herself. We also have François Fillon—the surprise candidate for France’s mainstream right, Les Républicaines—who is a Thatcherite. Lastly, we have Benoît Hamon—surprise candidate for Partide Socialiste—and Jean Luc Mélenchon, who, though an outsider, is de facto the candidate for the Communists and associated far-left politics.

So who does Alex think the French should vote for? Tony Blair, of course...

Mais Pourquoi, Alex?

This is not a particularly easy decision, in part because none of the candidates (as you may have guessed) are really ideal. But perhaps I can share my reasoning with you, and convince you to vote as such.

Let me be clear: Macron resembles Blair in more than just centrist policy and vague, feel-good rhetoric. The two are also similar in that both are quite dishonest politicians—they are masters of spin, however, and both convinced their electorates that they’re the Good Guys (TM). In Blair’s case, it was convincing everyone that he was a great, progressive politician, not beholden to corporate interests or neoliberal ideology; and in Macron’s case, it’s been about convincing the French electorate that a former investment banker is really an outsider ready to stir things up.

But even so, Macron remains the best option on the table. Allow me to firstly deal with the two main alternatives: Le Pen and Fillon.

Le Pen, as I have already said, is very, very, very bad. Her policies include (but are not limited to): dragging France out of the EU—likely destroying both entities—waging Cold War on Muslims, and ushering in an era of chest-thumping economic and political nationalism. The woman is essentially a Vichy collaborator, only her preferred foreign power is Putin’s Russia.

Fillon is basically a throwback to 1980s conservatism. Aside from his plans to cut 500,000 public sector jobs, ‘liberalise’ the labour market, and Thatcherise the economy, he also has another odious goal: to undermine gay marriage. It seems Section 28 continues on from the grave.

Once you understand who the two main candidates for the French presidency are, you will also understand my key imperative: anything but. Any of the other three candidates are preferable to these two execrable politicians.

Now, finally, onto the two remaining candidates. Hamon has been recently elected by the PS as their presidential candidate, scoring a surprise win against Manuel Valls, Hollande’s prime minister. On the surface, Hamon looks cool: he’s a radical leftwinger that beat the established candidate—a triumph of socialism over confused social democracy. But then, you look at his policies and his poll ratings. Hamon wants to a) tax robots b) reduce the working week to 32 hours and c) bring a system of universal income.

All of which would be great—if we lived in a post-scarcity society dominated by automation. Unfortunately, we don’t live in Utopia, and Hamon’s policies don’t make a whole lot of sense. Universal income would be impossible to afford unless it acts to replace social benefits, which would be idiocy: there are disabled people who need more than €750 a month to live on, and instead UBI would send money to millionaires. Taxing robots seems hard to implement, and pointless at best or Luddism at worst.

The last candidate, Mélenchon, is a nice enough guy. His platform is basically moderated Marxism: he wants to nationalise companies and regulate banks; he wants an increase in the minimum wage and also previously campaigned for a wage cap; he is a firm environmentalist, even supporting ‘degrowth’; and he wants to legalise cannabis.

I agree with most of his positions except cannabis and—more importantly—Europe. Mélenchon’s position vis-á-vis the EU is Marxist to an M: he thinks the concept of the EU is a great idea. As a supporting group, In Defence of Marxism, puts it: “Only a Socialist Federation of European States will unify the continent on a progressive basis, paving the way for a world socialist federation.” link

But, he thinks the current EU is contaminated by neoliberal economics; there needs to be a revolution, to replace the EU with the United Soviet European Socialist Republics.

Aside from being a bit bonkers, Mélenchon is polling at just over 10% of the vote. Recall the maxim I stated previously: anything but. It might be nice to have Mélenchon as president, but it’s highly unlikely he’ll be elected.

And this is the important bit: to keep Fillon out of winning the first round, Macron needs to get as much of the left vote as possible. The race is very close. The latest polls put Le Pen on around 25%, Fillon on 22%, Macron on 21%, Hamon on around 16% and Mélenchon just below him. (Poll by Kantar Sofres)

Of course you might wonder whether the latter two can team up. Unfortunately, Mélenchon is reluctant to join the PS campaign (the party is considered toxic in leftwing circles) and so this is sadly improbable. Even if it happened, there is unfortunately no guarantee that Mélenchon would beat Le Pen. He probably will—most French people don’t like her very much— but Macron is more likely to succeed in this regard. If this changes (and there have been some surprises in this election) I will reevaluate my position.

Until then, my message is this. The last thing France needs is a run off between a homophobe and a fascist. So, to the French left, I say: vote tactically. C’est la vie.

12 Dec 2016

And a Brexit in a Pear Tree...

Hello readers!

It has been sometime, alas, since I have been active here on the Magical Realm. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, university has taken a great deal of my time: I have two substantial papers to write; there is preparation for two exams; and there are assignments on top of it. The Wednesday of last week also required me to travel in order to be present in a lab session. All in all, this has proven time-consuming and demanding.

I have also been busy with several other necessities, including applying for huurtoeslag (rent benefit), tuition loans, and seeing the doctor.

Anyway, I have found a window of opportunity to write to you, dear readers. The topic of this post? Brexit. (Yes, it’s overdue.) But before I go into that, allow me a quick recap of the writing situation.

The Necromancer and the Ark

I am undertaking a ‘read and review’ session on Goodreads for the Necromancer. This means that I review 4 books from different authors, in the space of about 2 months; in return 4 authors (none of them the ones I’m reviewing) review my own book.

There are two benefits to this approach. Firstly, I get free books. Free books are always great. Secondly: I get reviews from people who are at least half-way competent at reviewing. The downside, of course, is that this process is rather time-consuming.

As for the Ark, I am concocting something special (and surprising). I will say no more than that.

Finally, do remember that the Necromancer will be getting a Kindle Countdown deal on Christmas. As I say—give someone a gift. I’m sure we’ll both appreciate it :)

The Brexit Bus

Some developments have occurred since I last blogged on this issue. Many of them are unsurprising. Theresa May is calling for hard Brexit—just like I said she would. Boris Johnson is making a fool of himself as Foreign Secretary: his undiplomatic remarks regarding Saudi Arabia’s proxy war in Yemen, while justified, are ultimately stupid, since the Tory government policy is to ignore it.

The Brexiters have also managed to come up with some more vacuities (I guess I ought to be surprised, but the Brexiters have shown limitless imagination in that regard.) One such is that the ‘Remoaners’ (what a charming neologism) ought to stop moaning; instead they should keep quiet and work for a successful Brexit.

The idiocy of this viewpoint is too great to unpick point by point; we would be here all day. Instead, it can be illustrated much more simply using an analogy. A bus is driving across a mountain road. Half of the people in the bus are shouting at the driver to drive the bus off the cliff; the other half is begging him not to. The former group, 52% to the other’s 48%, wins out. The bus drives over the cliff, killing most of the people onboard.

You cannot blame the 48% for shouting at the driver. It is not their fault that the bus is lying in ruins and several people are dead. Driving the bus off the cliff was a stupid idea. There’s no such thing as ‘successful Brexit’; it’s an oxymoron.

Another vacuity trotted out—this one favoured by Unionist Brexiters—is that Scotland voted for the UK to remain in the EU. The Unionists then go on to say, through a disingenuous reductio ad absurdum, that if the SNP had their way, why—we’d expect London, Bristol, Oxford, Liverpool and Manchester to split off from the UK!

The first argument is an exercise in desperate pedantry. The second argument is disingenuous because it assumes Scotland is a region, a bit like London or the Midlands—it’s the only way the argument from analogy can work. Of course Scotland is not a region; it is a nation. A nation with hundreds of years of history, its own devolved government, and the right to self-determination.

But how would Scotland, in practical terms, actually manage it? I have not addressed the constitutional, political and economic challenges of continued EU membership for Scotland, until now; and therefore these will be the last topic of this post.

Tough Choices for Scots; but a Bright Future Ahead

Economically, EEA membership and EU membership are, as far as Scotland is concerned, identical. The Accession procedure however is different: to accede to the European Union Scotland must meet the criteria (it already does, obviously); and it must be agreed unanimously by Member States. Some have floated the possibility that Spain might veto Scotland’s entry. I personally am skeptical of this; thankfully, as far as economics is concerned, this shouldn’t be a problem. To join the EFTA (and by extension to participate in the EEA) Scotland’s entry needs only to be agreed upon by Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland.

These countries have not suggested that they would oppose Scottish membership; indeed, considering the similar size and economies of the countries involved (Scotland has the same population as Norway, and an oil and gas sector) it is probable that such an arrangement would go smoothly. There is good will politically between the countries as well—and that’s just as important.

To be honest, I think most people in Scotland would be happy with this arrangement. The other problem that remains is the same problem that Scotland would have faced had it gone Independent back in 2014: currency.

The rUK has already clearly stated that Scotland cannot use the Pound Sterling. So Scotland has two choices: it can issue its own Scottish pounds, or it can join the euro. (There’s also a possibility that it may have to do the former before it does the latter, but I’m not too sure.) Obviously this decision will have to be thought through, but I think the evidence clearly points to the latter as being a better option.

Scotland would be a small country facing a period of uncertainty: this would likely mean that its currency would start out weak (which would cause problems with inflation) and subject to volatility as international money speculators assess and reassess its position. Moreover, two other serious problems present themselves. Scotland’s oil sector would likely—after the initial years of uncertainty—cause the Scottish pound to appreciate. Scotland will then suffer Dutch disease. On top of that, the volatility would make it more difficult for Scotland to trade with the rest of the EFTA.

Scotland could try and peg its currency to the euro in order to ameliorate these problems, but as Black Wednesday showed us—this is not so easy as it appears in theory. It is the forex that decides exchange rates, not central banks, and especially not the central banks of countries with a few million people.

There’s also a personal side for me. My parents are funding me to study in Amsterdam; I don’t want them to earn a weak Scottish pound. It would be far easier if their salary were paid in euros.

The last economic issue I wish to address is rUK trade. Unionists like Ruth Davidson (and some in my own party) proudly point out that most Scottish trade—64% to be precise—is with the rest of the UK. Presumably UK membership would be more important than EU membership, at least as far as economics is concerned. Right?

Well, not quite. For one, as autonomy Scotland claims, that 62% figure is questionable; it’s very difficult for companies to separate Scottish and rUK business operations. (And it is business operations we’re talking about—exports don’t just include physical goods.)

Leaving that aside, the trouble with percentages is that they can change. The 64% is a metric of Scottish exports now, as they stand with this constitutional arrangement. But may I remind Unionists that the rUK has 60 million people; the rest of the EU has 450 million, and EU trade agreements cover nearly the entirety of the rest of the world (population 6.5 billion, albeit most of them poor).

It is hardly inconceivable that Scottish exporters could export elsewhere—Europe after all is a huge internal market, with a highly streamlined regulatory framework, no tariffs, passporting rights, and countless other benefits the likes of which no other trading zone can match. And it’s close to Scotland too, and already well integrated, unlike Brexiter fantasy trade with countries that are thousands of miles away and lack anything close to what the EU is. (Just look at May’s bumbled trip to India.) Plus Scotland might benefit from rUK companies relocating to maintain preferential EU market access.

Anyway, with that out of the way, let’s look at the deeper questions of politics and constitution.

Clearly, Scotland wants to stay in the EU. And not just for economics—as Nicola Sturgeon has shown us, the EU means more to Scotland. There are, dare I say it, patriotic feelings involved. The EU represents something: the European Dream, openness, human rights, prosperity—take your pick.

So how does Scotland stay in the EU? As I’ve already mentioned, the Accession process requires Scotland to meet criteria (which it mostly already meets since it’s already in the EU, obviously). Some of these of course are to have a government and central bank, and for this reason Scotland would need to be independent.

The other side of the coin is unanimous agreement. Spain might veto Scotland’s entry because of Catalonia; but this should not be taken as granted. I’m sure Rajoy will not veto it if he gets Gibraltar. Or, Scotland can join the EEA and then simply wait. Rajoy’s position as Spain’s head of state is extremely fragile, and he could quite plausibly no longer be head of state within a few years.

Another possibility is that Scotland gets to stay in the EU by becoming the successor state to the UK. Apparently, this is legally feasible.

Anyway, let’s assume Scotland keeps its place in the EU. What about its relationship with the UK? There are some complicated problems to work out. If Scotland joins Schengen, it will have to have border checks with England. If Scotland doesn’t join Schengen, then again—it’s complicated. Scottish citizens would have freedom of movement to the EU, but UK citizens wouldn’t. But would UK citizens have freedom of movement to Scotland?

To be honest, I don’t see why Scotland can’t have its own arrangement with the UK. It could offer UK citizens freedom of movement (though only to Scotland, unless the UK citizens claim dual nationality) and the UK could reciprocate to only Scottish citizens.

Also, bear in mind that freedom of movement does NOT mean there is no hard border; that’s what Schengen is for. When I go to Romania by car, I have to pass border checks. But being a Romanian citizen I obviously have free movement, as do all other EU citizens.

Can Scotland therefore maintain an open border with the UK? I believe the answer is no, for a number of complicated reasons. The UK will likely be out of the customs union, so goods would have to be inspected. As for people, EU counter-terrorism is one thing to think about. Freedom of movement is another: UK citizens could enter Scotland then (if Scotland is in Schengen) head illegally to work in the EU.

Anyway, let’s not get worked up about this. So long as freedom of movement exists between the UK and Scotland, people will be fine to go to either country. A ‘hard border’ sounds scary but it’s really not the end of the world—it’s just formality, no different from passport checks at the airport. I do it all the time. Heck, UK citizens do it all the time when they go to Europe.

Final Thoughts

This has proven a long and complicated post on what is a long and complicated issue. I hope you have found me intelligible (do leave a comment if anything is unclear!) and interesting. Now, work calls. Keep following the Magical Realm for a Christmas special!

5 Nov 2016

Vote Hillary Clinton

Hello readers!

You may be wondering what Alex is up to. How goes the new edition of the Necromancer? Will it be out this November? Has Alex contacted reviewers and built up an audience?

The answer to all those questions is of course yes: I have been most occupied with republishing the new edition of the Necromancer. However, as you may be able to guess, that is not the topic of this post. Rather, it is indeed—as the title alludes—to that most vexing of political questions: American presidential elections.

Alex’s reasons for entertaining this topic are relatively straightforward: American elections are more important than, say, Icelandic elections; and this particular election has some particularly interesting politics involved. Being a student of political science, I am inevitably drawn to it.

Anyway, let’s proceed to the introduction.

Introduction

Ordinarily, I do not partake in American politics. I don’t write about it; I scarcely even follow it; and I don’t waste time thinking about it. The reasons are multifold—the most compelling is that I live 5000 kilometres away. And directly inline with that, I don’t consider them relevant to my life.

Oh sure: American politics is Trumped up (yes, I know) to no end. But in reality, the French, German, Spanish and Italian elections—while rather less glamorous—are far more important in the scope of European politics. They will determine the deal that Britain gets after Brexit, or the EU funds available to construct infrastructure projects in Romania, or the specifics of monetary policy that affect Dutch exporters.

This leads me to my third gripe with American politics: it is excessively sensationalised. In fact it resembles not so much an election as a national popularity contest (intermixed with a healthy dose of showbiz, naturally). It’s hard to take seriously—the unseriousness of it is terribly offputting.

Another explanation may be my own personal politics. I am a Socialist; I make Bernie Sanders look like a laidback moderate. Being far to the left of the American political spectrum can make the whole debate resemble a popularity contest between a billionaire whose favourite colour is red, and another who prefers blue.

I admit it does breed a certain contempt. I do not speak here of nationalism, or even the voguish Anti-Americanism of the kind espoused by critics of American foreign policy. I mean an ideological contempt; the whole of American politics seems altogether sordid to me. The eminent HL Mencken, an American strongly critical of that nation’s government, put it more eloquently than I:

In the present case it is a little inaccurate to say I hate everything. I am strongly in favor of common sense, common honesty and common decency. This makes me forever ineligible to any public office of trust or profit in the Republic

But, let us move on. Now that you know my background and the perspective I am approaching the issue from, allow me to elucidate on my stance.

Clinton versus Trump: Crook versus Crook?

On one side of the arena we have Donald Trump. He is a walking embodiment of every American stereotype I’ve come across: unctuously nationalist, blatantly avaricious, clearly ignorant, spectacularly sexist, and of course racist.

Opposing him, there is Hillary Clinton. Numerous criticisms have been levelled at her: she’s arrogant, hawkish, and in the pockets of Wall Street. The narrative of some among the American left—and several commentators of various political stripes here on the Continent—is that the two are virtually indistinguishable. Crook versus crook, or perhaps even Satan versus the Devil.

This narrative is plausible, but wrong.

It is, in fact, dangerously wrong. You may be surprised to hear this: after all, am I not a Socialist? How can I possibly support Hillary Clinton?

You’d be right on one level—I would have preferred a Sanders presidency. Nonetheless, we must deal with what we have. The registered Democrats chose not to elect Sanders, so now the US must face a stark choice: the presidency of a moron, bully, and megalomaniac; or the presidency of a less than ideal woman.

And that, at the end of the day, is the reality. Clinton is not the devil. I do not mean to say that she is perfect—indeed her links to Wall Street all but guarantee she won’t try anything too radical. America needs someone better than Clinton. The millions in poverty, and the grotesque face of American inequality, will not be resolved by a little centrist tinkering.

Incidentally, I am aware that Clinton’s language has become more Berniesque following her succession to the Democratic mantle. Some of it is genuine: she does strongly support the right of a woman to have an abortion, or the need for serious gun control.

I don’t believe she will usher a new era in economic thought, however—that was Bernie’s ticket. Clinton is just a centrist employing the language of the left, because it is politically expedient to do so. This is not to disparage her necessarily—sometimes it is smart to make the right noises—but merely to highlight that Clinton’s plans for a fair economy are grounded more in rhetoric than in real substance.

But for all that, the woman is still infinitely preferable to the alternative.

It’s not just that she’s less bad; that she’s not misogynistic, racist, or actively engaged in trampling over the proletariat by dodging taxes and outsourcing to Mexico. (Ironically, in the case of the latter.)

The woman is genuinely a nicer alternative. Despite some of her politics, there is a great deal to commend in her. She is highly competent, having proven herself in various roles of upper government; her grasp of public policy is strong, particularly in (for example) carbon-free energy and corporate taxation; and while not likely to shake the nest too much, she is also unlikely to bring it down.

A particularly striking example of the latter would be foreign policy. Trump’s misdeavours in this regard are almost without parallel: from building a wall with Mexico, weakening NATO, being friends with the Russian kleptocracy, and—worst of all—threatening to use nuclear weapons render him temperamentally unfit to be president.

Some of us here in the Continent are sadly naive about Trump’s foreign policy regime. Typically, these are young, naive, left-leaning students who are angry with Clinton’s interventions in Iraq and Libya.

Even setting aside the complexities of those cases—and they are complex, far beyond the narrow-minded narratives of the Anti-American psyche—believing that Donald Trump will be better in this regard is foolish, to put it mildly. It’s not just that the man is foolhardy, ignorant, and has a towering vanity matched only by his nationalist fervour; it’s that Trump is fundamentally more inclined to war than even Hillary Clinton.

One should not confuse Trump’s professed trade isolationism with military isolationism. Throughout history, the two have been rather distinct. Trump may want to build a wall and impose tariffs—but he also wants to spend money in the military, and put it to use fighting Isis. He does, after all, regularly attack Clinton for being too soft on terrorists. Is that really what you want, Stop the War advocates?

The Third Party Question

The final question I wish to address is that of the alternative: why not vote for a third party?

There are two very good reasons for why you shouldn’t. The first is often repeated: in the American electoral system, a vote for Jill Stein is de facto a vote for Trump, and a vote for Johnson is de facto a vote for Clinton.

The other reason—which is perhaps even better—is that the other two candidates are piss-poor. Johnson, a libertarian, is no better than Trump: his socioeconomic policy will prove a disaster so profound even Trump won’t be able to match it. People will literally die of cold, hunger, and disease on America’s streets. (And let’s not even touch on the man’s ignorance of Aleppo, documented live on television.)

As for Jill Stein? She lives in cloud cuckoo land. 100% renewable energy by 2030? Impossible: there is nowhere near enough storage capacity in the grid to allow it. Creating 20 million jobs by doing it? Pure fantasy. A return to 18th century agriculture? The world will starve.

Conclusion

My conclusion mirrors my title: vote Hillary Clinton. Of course I do not hand out my recommendation without caveats (you should know that I always caveat). The woman isn’t perfect: her economic policy will not be sufficient to deal with that country’s problems; her record on LGBT rights is complex; and there is reason to be weary of her links with Wall Street. America is a corrupt country. (Yes, it’s true.)

But if the worst that can be said about Hillary is that she’s not ideal, than far worse can be leveled against Trump: diplomatically, he would be a disaster; in foreign policy there’s no telling what he would do; and his economic policy will be worse than Hillary’s. Clinton just won’t make things much better than they are; Trump will make sure they worsen.

Aside from being unfit to lead, the man himself is odious. He’s a corrupt businessman who bankrupted himself 70 times and doesn’t pay taxes; he believes Mexicans are rapists; he thinks all Muslims are unconditionally evil; and he likes to grope women. The only good thing I can say about him is that he’s not homophobic.

And for all of Hillary’s problems, I like her. She’s competent—and I deeply admire competence. Her position on renewable energy, climate change, and fracking is one I find particularly well-informed. One need not vote for her with an upturned nose; in fact she will make a decent President, no worse than the others that have gone before her.

Anyway, that’s it for today. I will conclude with a warming, handed out by HL Mencken eighty years ago, but still all too relevant today:

As democracy is perfected, the office of president represents, more and more closely, the inner soul of the people. On some great and glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their heart's desire at last and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron.

5 Aug 2016

My Review of Capital in the 21st Century, Part Two

Hail readers!

I am at last back to civilisation, and will remain here for the next week or so. Although I am very busy—I need to pay my tuition fee to Amsterdam, I need to procure various documents, and of course there’s work to be done on the Ark—I have taken the effort to continue writing here on the Magical Realm. As part of these efforts, here is the second part of my review of Thomas Piketty’s Capital. (For the first part, look here.)

My review of Capital in the 21st Century, part two.

Previously, I wrote a review on the first third or so of Capital that I had read. As you may be able to guess, this review will concern the theses presented in the next third of the book—as well as to elaborate further on some of the initial theses, which reoccur throughout the book.

In Capital, Piketty presents a number of new topics. He moves away from the definition of the capital income ratio, its evolution throughout time, and other abstract macroeconomic indicators; instead he treats inequality in a more visceral, recognisable sense: he talks about what kind of incomes and wealth the upper and lower deciles possess.

For example, the top 1% of a nation’s earners get anything from a couple of percent of national economy (equating to a wage of about 5 or 6 times the average)—as was the case in 1970s Sweden, the most egalitarian nation on record—to as much as 20% (as is the case in the United States presently).

In terms of capital, the picture is more stark and has always been so. In the heyday of inegalitarianism—such as in Belle Epoque France or, worse, 1900s Britain—the top 1% held about 60% of all the nation’s wealth. Note also that the yields of this capital was potentially even more unequal—as Piketty shows, those with large fortunes get better returns than those with more modest ones.

Piketty goes on to detail at least three more very important features of inequality. Firstly, capital income is much more significant than wage income the higher up the social strata you go. For the lower class—about half the population—capital income is insignificant. For the middle class (the top 40% or so) capital income is more significant but still small.

But go up to the 1%, and capital income is significant—though a minority. By the time you get to the top 0.1%, capital income makes up the majority of that class’s income.

Secondly, Picketty reveals that the ‘middle class’ phenomenon was very real and relatively recent. Up to the turn of the twentieth century, the top 10% of society owned as much as 90% of the nation’s wealth—as was the case in Britain. But by the middle of the century, the top 40% of society owned about 35% of the nation’s wealth. The bottom half of society still owns close to nothing—not much has changed in that regard—but it is interesting to note that a middle class does exist.

Thirdly, Piketty links inequality of capital directly to the macroeconomic metrics of the capital/income ratio, the rate of return on capital, and the rate of growth of the economy. He explains why inequality became noticeably less pronounced after the war—in no small part because of the political consensus that developed, but also because of the high growth and large shocks to capital that the period saw—and why the 21st century, with its slower growth and higher capital ratio, is becoming more unequal.

Anyway, the point of all this is that Capital in the 21st Century is an extremely relevant and very persuasive work of non-fiction. Piketty’s vast reams of detailed, long-term (think 200+ years) and highly considered data are a masterpiece. Other economists—such as Kuznets—are like pygmies in the presence of a giant like Piketty.

Nevertheless, I do have one or two nitpicks with Piketty—most notably when it comes to the role education plays in inequality, and more so, on the public policy that has been the norm for the past couple of decades where it concerns education.

Is Education Unequal? And if so, what?

Piketty believes unequal access to education—and, in particular, university education—is an important driver of inequality. However, I disagree with this, for two reasons. On a first point of order, I think that university education in most European countries is as equal as it’s ever going to be. (I will elaborate on this shortly.) And on a second point of order, I think Piketty—like most of the political class—is wrong to focus on education as the remedy.

But firstly, allow me to clarify what I mean when I say that university education in Europe is as equal as it’s ever going to be. Piketty, when arguing that university education is unequal, focuses on the usual metrics: the parent’s income and education as predictors of the child’s education and future income. The fact that the two are correlated—as most of us know, kids from well-educated and rich families are more likely to end up in university than other kids—is something Piketty doesn’t like.

But two things need to be clarified. Firstly, the philosopher in me needs to point out that this may be an inequality of outcomes and not necessarily an inequality of opportunity. Throughout most of Europe, there are negligible tuition fees. There also grants, loans, and scholarships to help disadvantaged pupils. In Denmark, they even pay students to attend university.

(Note that I do not include Britain when I say ‘most of Europe’. Here, the government has abolished grants, there are very few scholarships, and tuition fees are very high. Going to university involves accruing large amounts of debt if you’re not from a well-off family, and that debt disproportionately affects poorer students.)

The fact that university education in Europe is available to all is enough to make many centre-right minded people happy. If there is equality of opportunity, it is reasoned that any inequality of outcomes is because the poorer students don’t want to go to university and don’t want to work as hard.

I for one am skeptical of such an argument, which is why my disagreement with Piketty is of a different sort. I fully agree that poorer students are disadvantaged in going to university—for the simple fact that their parents don’t value university education. If you’re from a poorer, manual-labour background, it is hard to understand why university education is valuable.

So yes; we can certainly complain about this, and formulate policy to try and encourage students from poorer backgrounds to go to university—to inculcate that sense that education is valuable.

But ultimately, none of this is as important as Piketty makes out. Such a scheme may increase social mobility, but it will not change inequality—and indeed, it may have unintended consequences.

This is because of the very simple fact that while well-paying professional jobs—like engineers, doctors, programmers, what have you—do indeed require university-level education, they are ultimately finite. We can’t all be engineers and doctors. Making millions of young people go to university is therefore a waste of valuable time and money.

As many young graduates are discovering, going to university only to end up doing a job you could have done without a degree is the ultimate disappointment. It is grossly wasteful, too: going to university for three years costs the graduate and the taxpayer around £30,000—and the figure is rising. Going for four or five years to do a Master’s (as many increasingly are) adds another £20,000 onto that. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg. Going for four or five years to do a useless degree followed by a useless master also stops you being in the labour market for four or five years. Once more, this means tens of thousands of pounds of lost earnings. It means thousands of pounds of lost tax revenue. And it means less experience doing a job.

I’m not even done yet! This in turn has social externalities. It means getting a mortgage later; it means less money to pay for pensions. It frequently means waiting longer to have a child—hence the lower fertility rate of many European countries. (Caveat: this is of course just one factor of many.)

So you see, I think Piketty is deeply mistaken to place so much faith on university education. University is increasingly becoming a tool for social disunity rather than progression.

So What Should Be Done, Instead?

Although I disagree with Piketty on the issue of education, he is right about two other things. For one, capital: its tendency to grow increasingly concentrated and bring increasingly large returns is a major force for ‘economic divergence’ (i.e. rampant inequality). Therefore, Piketty is absolutely right that an important way to reduce inequality would be through the taxation of income from capital, and—also—the taxation of inheritance.

Piketty also uses that data to reveal that inequality is also, of course, from wages as well as from capital. Indeed, the reason that current day Europe is more egalitarian than the present day US is not because of capital—which in any case is larger in Europe—but because incomes are more compressed. Since income from wages makes up about three quarters to two-thirds of all income, a more compressed wage restructure results in a much more equal country (even if capital incomes are very unequal).

So, it logically follows that we also need to compress the wage structure. In fact, I propose that is a far more important goal than putting students in university.

How can this be done, you might wonder? Piketty has one obvious answer: fight against the supermanager. Piketty shows than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, increasingly large CEO compensation—directly in the form of pay-packets, but even more so through stocks and bonuses—is an important reason for why inequality of wages has increased since the 1980s in Britain and the United States.

CEO compensation is an issue of the complex social structures and institutions that exist in firms. One way to reduce CEO compensation would be to change the structures of corporate governance: to give workers and unions more say in management’s pay (to move to a ‘stakeholder model’ as in Germany, in other words) and to give shareholders more say in CEO salaries. (The latter, albeit, will tend to increase CEO compensation in times of strong stock market performance, but it will at least prevent CEOs from increasing their pay packets when firms are actually doing badly.)

Another way would be to change social norms. Firms, like everything else, operate in the social structures that exist in that country. If huge CEO pay-packets are frowned upon—as they are in Switzerland and Sweden, for example—then it is the case that supersalaries are less common.

A final, and simpler way to reduce CEO salaries would be to tax them. Piketty shows that when the Anglo-Saxon nations had high rates of marginal taxation—as high as 98%, which was the case for Britain in the 70s—CEO pay-packets were a lot smaller. (Why? Because the firm’s management aren’t going to give their money away to the government.)

Personally, I think we could go even further. Of course lowering the insane CEO compensation would leave more money for the rest of us, but who will get that money? The middle-management lower down? Or the workers—the janitors, the people at the tills, the rank and file?

That’s why I think Piketty needs one more ingredient in his egalitarian soup: unionisation. This also ties in with my point regarding education. We can’t make everyone a doctor or a lawyer. But what we can do is make sure that even the burger-flippers at McDonald’s get paid a decent wage.

Indeed, the Scandinavian countries do this, and with considerable success. Unionisation is why the Danish McDonald’s workers gets paid around 240,000 Danish Kroner—that’s €30,000 or $40,000—instead of $20,000, as they do in the US. Double the workers’ wages and you’ll find greater social cohesion. And nor will you have to obsess over who goes to university: you won’t need a degree to live a reasonably comfortable life.

The International Element

Another aspect that Piketty makes clear is that any means to reduce inequality—through taxation especially—will have to contend with the global reality of capital and highly-paid workers. Piketty believes that a tax on capital should be Europe-wide, or even global.

Can this be achieved? I believe so. The EU can certainly mandate minimum taxes—it already does so, in fact: every EU country must have a primary VAT rate of at least 15%. They have to apply fuel duty at a minimum level. It doesn’t seem implausible that the EU could, say, mandate a minimum 15% rate of corporate tax, or require a minimum tax on income from capital.

And the EU might even strong-arm other countries into doing the same. Tasty trade deals for the US might come with strings attached—minimum rates of tax. I’m sure the EU could also negotiate deals with the South American countries, Japan, and possibly India—with which it has very good relations.

Final Words

As I’ve said: Piketty’s Capital is a fantastic work of non-fiction. It approaches the issue of income inequality with a rigorousness, nuance and intellectualism that few can manage. It turns abstract and misinformed public debate into concrete data.

I do disagree with some of Piketty’s conclusions, but so far I am keen on reading more.

22 Jun 2016

Final Words Before the Referendum

I have written extensively on the issue of the EU referendum; the most detailed post is of course my essay, A Socialist’s Case for EU Membership, along with my more digestible post on the Jo Cox murder

This post will be the last before the referendum tomorrow. Incidentally, tomorrow I also have my transport economics exam—an apt coincidence if ever there was one.

Of course, this makes me very busy. I have a significant amount of practice and revision left to do for tomorrow’s exam. And, to top it off—tonight I will hopefully be getting feedback on the cover for the Necromancer! This is courtesy to the company that helped me find my editor, Reedsy. Reedsy is a marketplace dedicated to writers looking for editors, marketing people, and designers; as part of this goal, they are hosting a live video on Facebook with one of their professional cover designers. My own book should be on the list. Hopefully, I’ll get some good advice!

Anyway, since I am so busy this post will be brief. It will mainly focus on the BBC’s ‘Great Debate’ (haha) and on the points there made.

Logic is Not Leave’s Strongpoint

One of the claims made by our very own Gisela Stuart—a Labour MP (!)—is that the EU is responsible for Greece’s 50% youth unemployment, and for the economic problems of southern Europe more generally.

Of course, this is nonsense. In fact, Greece’s situation would be worse if it weren’t for the EU.

Why? The answer is simple: a lot of the Greek government’s debt belongs to foreign creditors. Among them are Italy, France and Germany (yes, Italy loaned Greece money) but a lot of money is owed to the IMF and other international creditors.

Now, Greece is in the euro. The euro is a much maligned currency, but Greece’s financial problems would be quite a bit worse if it wasn’t in the euro. This is because of a simple reason: if Greece still had the drachma, the drachma would have devalued hugely in the course of the crisis.

This would have been disastrous for Greece. Greece would have seen its debt multiply before its eyes; for the money it borrowed it borrowed in euros and dollars. If, before the crisis, 300 drachma = 1 dollar, and if, after the crisis, 1 dollar = 900 drachma, Greece would effectively have to pay 3 times as much to service the debt denominated in $.

So if Greece wasn’t in the euro, it would either have to pay vast amounts of money servicing the debt, or more likely it would default. Now: defaulting isn’t such a bad thing in the long-run, but there’s no doubt it causes a lot of short-term pain. Without the euro a default would have been inescapable. With the euro, Greece at least has a choice.

A large depreciation in the local currency—such as the one Iceland saw, and which Greece would have seen if it wasn’t in the euro—would also have terrible consequences for inflation. Economists lament Greece’s 1% deflation, but history shows us that 100% inflation is far, far worse. The Weimar Republic saw hyperinflation like that. They ended up burning money for fuel, unemployment was sky high, and they eventually elected Hitler. (Another little known fact.)

A Greek hyperinflation would have left Greeks freezing in their homes—foreign gas being too expensive to afford. It would have left cars unused, with no petrol to fill their tanks. Those who bought mortgages in foreign currency would lose their homes.

So you’ll excuse me if, when seeing a Labour MP so unwittingly suggest the destruction of a country’s economy, I feel my blood boiling.

You’ll also have to excuse me if I scoff at the notion that the euro caused the Greek crisis. Let me put it simply: a country whose government accrues debt for decades (even before joining the euro), whose politicians lie to its people and claim there’s plenty of money, and which has seen its largest employer and revenue stream (tourism) decimated by the global financial crash, is going to suffer—euro or no euro!

Sadly, blaming the European Union for the failures of national governments is a common tactic of the Leave campaign. The truth is often harder to swallow.

My Faustian Pact

I promised that this would be a short post. I aim to fulfill this promise. I have, incidentally, also made a promise to myself: if the UK leaves the EU, I will do two things. Firstly, I will leave the UK. Going to university in Amsterdam or Leuven suddenly seems like a much more attractive proposition than spending £9000 a year to study in a country that will soon become isolated by a wave of nationalism.

And secondly, I will read HL Mencken’s Notes on Democracy. As one of history’s more prominent (and perhaps most eloquent) critic of democracy, he believed that the masses would always be too ignorant to make good decisions; that they will always be manipulated by demagogues and populists for their own ends.

Eighty years on, Mencken’s argument has more than a ring of truth to it. Tomorrow he will be put to the test.

I hope he will be proven wrong. But I suspect his timeless words will prove correct.

13 May 2016

A Socialist’s Case for EU Membership

Hail readers!

Previously, I promised that I would address the troublesome matter of the EU referendum. Well; here I am. My essay is one I shall attempt to keep reasonably brief, although the complexity of the matter will inevitably require substantial argument. No matter.

Broadly speaking, there are will be two main themes in my essay. Firstly, I will make a positive case for EU membership; and secondly, I will disabuse the Brexit case of its claims. But before that, allow me to ask a different question…

Why is the Referendum Important?

You may be wondering why, in the midst of my exam revision, and in the process of important work on my novel, I have decided to write on this. Well; this is because the EU referendum is very important—to me personally and to the country as a whole.

Firstly, allow me to be blunt: Brexit would be damaging to me personally. I hold Romanian citizenship; this confers to me both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that I can study in the Netherlands under EU tuition fees—typically around €2000/annum or so. If Brexit occurs, the significant number of British students intending to study in Holland would very likely have to pay non-EU fees. These are about three times the EU fees. (Suckers!)

Unfortunately, the current government is not very accommodating of foreign people. Theresa May, our dear Home Secretary, is already planning on deporting NHS nurses (as well as teachers and other non-EU workers) that earn less than £37,000 £35000 (Independent, apparently the exact figure has changed) a year—for no other reason than that they’re not EU/UK citizens. EU rules make it illegal for her to do the same to EU workers. However, if Britain were to leave, there’s no telling what she would do once free of her legal shackles.

If I were to leave for Holland, May’s antics would be of no personal consequence. If I intend to study here, however, I would be more concerned. Although it’s rather unlikely that she’ll be deporting me—considering that I’ve lived here since I was a child, speak English fluently and will be a university student soon—she and the Tory government may remove EU employment protections. This might affect my parents (who also hold Romanian citizenship although they do also hold Right to Work), it might affect me, and it will certainly many British workers who will see their already threadbare employment rights weakened further.

Anyway, the argument I will be presenting here will not be about personal circumstance, or indeed the people who will suffer if Brexit occurs (although there will be many, both British and non-British, they will be a minority).

No: my argument will be about Britain as a whole. And more importantly still, about Europe as a whole.

The Case for Bremain

If you haven’t already realised, I don’t think very highly of Brexit. In fact, I think it’s a staggeringly stupid idea—on par with austerity and selling off council housing. Maybe worse (and that’s saying something).

But why, you wonder, is this?

Firstly, I’ll say that I am not in the minority. This is not to employ an ad populum argument; it is merely to highlight the fact that Brexit, and more broadly Euroscepticism, is actually a minority view held by people convinced that others share their view. I don’t just mean in Britain—although EU membership is advocated by both the trade unions and big business (a rare feat!), the majority of small businesses, most political parties, and the majority of the population when polled. I also mean in the rest of Europe: in most EU countries, Euroscepticism is the view of about 20% of the population; the rest of the population thinks breaking up the EU is madness. Even the Americans think Brexit is a bad idea.

Anyway, back to Britain. None of this is not to say that Brexit is impossible—it’s because of a thing called differential turnout. The majority of people may agree to EU membership as a whole (leaving aside one or two specific issues) but they may not bother to vote. The leave brigade, on the other hand, is obsessed with leaving.

Once you understand that Britain is in serious danger of letting a minority make a decision affecting the entire country, you begin to understand why Brexit is a bad idea on purely democratic terms.

You may of course argue that people have the right to vote and that not voting is a choice they make. However, this argument is rather naive for two reasons. Firstly, some of us actually don’t have the right to vote even though the referendum affects us a great deal (more than anyone, perhaps). Secondly, the reality is that for a democratic system to actually be meaningfully democratic, people have to vote—it’s a constitutional responsibility.

Leaving this aside, why does Britain need to stay in the EU and why is the Leave campaign wrong?

Trade

The economics of Bremain have been hashed out a number of times. They are not, in my opinion, the most compelling reason to remain; but nor can they be ignored, and it would be silly for me—an economics student—to fail to address them in this essay.

Let’s start with an obvious one: trade. The rEU accounts for half of the UK’s exports:

Note: you may need to allow your browser to display HTTP content over HTTPS in order to view the above graphic. If you can’t, see the original link

If the UK left, it could see a return to before EU conditions—to tariffs, regulations, quotas, and other measures inhibiting exports. The UK could renegotiate its trade deals, but anyone who has studied the history of trade deals will tell you that such negotiations are likely to take decades.

It is also rather unlikely that the UK could negotiate terms that are as favourable as they are now, let alone more favourable. The EU isn’t stupid: it knows that favourable terms under Brexit would bolster similar isolationalist parties in other countries, like FN in France. If the UK leaves, you can count against favourable terms.

Also, look at Switzerland and Norway: they still have to agree to EEA regulations—and these in fact make up the bulk of EU regulations (about 80% according to most estimates). And: they have no say in how these regulations are decided. They have no MEPs, no commissioners, and nobody on the European Council.

It is also extremely unlikely that the UK could realistically avoid trading with Europe. For one, geographic proximity is still a reality when it comes to trade. Shipping heavy objects or time-sensitive goods vast distances does add to cost.

But more importantly, the UK simply wouldn’t have the clout to negotiate the kind of trade deals the EU can. It is a simple question of numbers. The largest and strongest economies have the greatest bargaining power and secure the best deals. The US has a GDP of $17.4T (that’s trillion); China’s is $10T; and the EU’s is the largest, at. $18.5T. The UK? Our GDP is $3T. That’s a fraction of other nations (All stats from Trading Economics, 2016 data.)

Nevertheless, there is more to this fiasco than trade. Yes, trade is nice, but trade alone doesn’t have a massive overall impact on the UK economy.

There are other economic issues that are more significant, however. One such is to do with standards and regulations. Now, for anyone not familiar, the EU has numerous regulatory powers when it comes to what goods can be traded in the EU and how. The EU sets standards on car safety, food safety, and on how consumer goods should be built. It sets consumer rights; firms operating in the EU know their legal duties and know that the EU will enforce them.

The EU, believe it or not, makes consumer goods cheaper. This is because firms spend a not-insignificant amount of money on testing and meeting all of these regulations. (Obviously this is more expensive than no regulations, but do you honestly want your hairdryer to electrocute you? Do you want to be sure that the food you buy at the supermarket is safe to eat?) Now: in the instance where a multinational organisation like the EU sets standards, every firm operating in Europe can have one standard to worry about. Not 28.

If the UK were to leave, consumer prices would begin to rise; it is simply the nature of standards to diverge. The UK would have one standard, the EU another, and any firms intending to sell goods in the UK will have to charge more in order to pay for their testing and possible redesign.

Other economic arguments centre around immigration. These I won’t address because there’s no significant evidence either way.

Anyway; it’s pretty obvious that Brexit would have economic consequences. Only the most obstinate Eurosceptics deny this. It is the view of the vast majority of economists. But as I say: this has to do with more than just economics. Let me present some big-picture arguments for the EU.

Global Warming

Anthropogenic global warming is scientific consensus. (See this Meta Analysis published by Skeptical Science.) I’m not going to bother debating this, since it’s not worthy of any debate. Nor is there need for convincing—the vast majority of the people of Europe accept it.

Now the question becomes: how do we tackle anthropogenic climate change? Obviously this is a complex topic. But a few aspects do emerge.

Global warming is caused by greenhouse gases (GHGs) like CO2 and methane. Reducing these emissions is extremely challenging from a technical standpoint; generating energy, and storing it for use in transport applications, from non-polluting sources is difficult. Wind power is somewhat variable, and unable to provide all of our energy demands—although it is relatively cost-effective. Solar power is promising but is currently expensive. Carbon-neutral resources like rapeseed oil are limited by supply. But you know what? These problems are gradually being resolved.

Nevertheless, alternative energy tends to have a few key problems. One of these is cost: although the cost of these technologies is generally not great, the cost difference between them and a polluting technology is significant enough to be political.

That’s the thing about global warming; it is political as well as technological. And when it comes to the political, countries have shown that they are willing to pollute if it means obtaining an economic advantage over countries that do not pollute.

And this is where the EU comes in. Why? Because the EU is supranational; it can actually enforce regulations on member states. (Do I need remind anyone of the Kyoto protocol?)

Indeed, the EU has been a key driver in tackling climate change. It has subscribed to some of the toughest climate targets of any large economy (Europa); and of the large economies, it has seen one of the largest reductions in CO2 since 1990 (Eurostat). This is better than the US—which saw no significant decrease (EPA)—despite per-capita emissions being lower to begin with.

Furthermore, the EU has an effect that is less easy to quantify but no less significant: it is a role model for the rest of the world. It shows that emissions can be cut, and in particular, that Westerners are not hypocrites. This is important; China has long complained by hypocrisy on the part of the US. It can’t use that argument against the EU. Indeed, one may plausibly claim that the EU contributed to China’s recent drive towards decarbonisation.

A few Eurosceptics, particularly those left-inclined, may wonder whether the UK could achieve similar things without the EU. But this attitude is rather naïve, for several reasons. Firstly, the EU is much larger than the UK; if the UK remains a member state, it has greater power to influence other member states (which it would lack were it to leave) and it can influence the world by helping set EU foreign policy.

Secondly, as I’ve pointed out before, there is a conflict of interest here between states. Suppose, for argument’s sake, the UK were to support lowering carbon emission. Now suppose that the EU did not in fact exist. If we, say, introduced tough regulations on industrial pollution—would other countries follow? Or would firms pack up and move towards countries with more lax regulation, harming us and benefitting them?

And most of all, would we be able to continue our political support for CO2 reduction in these circumstances? If we can’t, global warming will continue. And that hurts all of us.

International Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion

The Panama leaks, and many instances of global tax evasion before it, should give us an indication of what kind of money is being laundered; what effect that money would have had on our deficit-enduring, cash-strapped governments; and how difficult it is to deal with tax evasion of this sort alone.

The EU has undertaken numerous projects to combat tax fraud, evasion and avoidance. One example is the recently-approved bill to force multinationals to release country-by-country financial reports—a move which our own government initially resisted. Considering our own dear Prime Ministers’ interesting operations in Panama, this may not come as a surprise.

In any case, the situation here is much the same as with climate change. The EU is big; it can secure deals with tax havens like Monaco and Andorra (Europa). And once more, the EU is a stalwart against what, in economic parlance, is known as ‘fiscal competition’. In other words, if we—for whatever reason—decide to raise taxes on income, VAT or (most importantly) corporate tax, other European nations cannot take advantage of us. This is because of numerous EU laws, such as the minimum 15% VAT threshold and various regulations regarding corporate practice within the EU.

The EU has also clamped down on various clever tax avoidance schemes. One has personally affected me.

You see, some months ago, Amazon—being quartered in Luxembourg—was able to pay 3% VAT on ebooks sold within its marketplace. Then the EU brought in regulations requiring digital goods to be subject to taxation in the country of purchase. Now people have to pay 20% VAT when they buy the Necromancer, instead of 3%. And the UK government gets the money, not Luxembourg. I may not be pleased, my readers may not be pleased, but we all have to pay tax.

To quote Jeremy Corbyn: there cannot be one rule for the rich and another for everyone else.

Think of the Big Picture

Finally, there’s the old bugbear of national security to think about.

If the UK were to leave, the EU and the UK would weaken their ability to influence world events. Putin would be delighted: the EU is his worst nightmare. It’s right on his doorstep; and it has allowed several Eastern European countries (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria) to escape Russian political, economic and military dominance.

Of course there’s NATO. But NATO isn’t an economic union; it’s not even a political union outside of the purely military aspect of it. NATO hasn’t bought human rights to Europe—or at least not beyond overthrowing a few unsavoury dictators (cough Milošević cough) NATO members don’t have to sign the ECHR, they don’t have to have strong democratic government, and most of all: NATO can’t provide trade deals and investment to nations hoping to escape Putin’s claws. The Eastern block can attest to this.

Also, the EU is a military alliance distinct from NATO; this is important if you happen to be, say, the Ukraine.

So the EU is undeniably beneficial to Europe. ‘But what about Britain!’ some of you may cry.

Now this is where it gets interesting. Firstly, it’s worth realising that the problems inherent in a military and political union can be much worse than under the EU. Among EU nations, Britain is an equal. NATO? The US is king there.

But let’s consider more than just the military. What of other diplomatic, legal and economic considerations?

I will not deny that the EU acts on the interests of all of Europe; if this occasionally conflicts with the interests of the UK, so be it. Indeed, the EU’s interests frequently do conflict with many other member states aside from Britain.

But you know what? If the EU didn’t exist, we would all suffer. If every country in Europe simply pursued its own interests, Europe would be fragmented and weak. Strength is in co-operation; and sometimes, one has own to accept an unfavourable stance on one issue in order to accept a favourable stance on a dozen other issues.

This concept, however, seems to elude the Brexit brigade.

The Case Against Brexit: Myth and Fatuous Argument

Let me now address the many claims made against the EU, and why they don’t hold up to scrutiny.

The EU is Undemocratic/Unaccountable

This claim is made by both left and right Eurosceptics, and it’s preposterous in both cases. The EU:

  • Has a parliament elected by elections held in member states (they don’t call them the European elections for nothing!) and composed of MEPs belonging to national parties—as my own party frequently reminds me in news bulletins;
  • It has a commission selected by the parliament, held accountable by the parliament, and incapable of passing laws without the parliament’s support. The commission is like the cabinet of the UK government; it is selected by the parliament in the same way that the leader and cabinet is selected by the party. The only difference is that the commission has more limited powers than do our government ministers;
  • Thirdly and finally, it also has the Council of Ministers, which is composed of the government ministers of each individual member state (who are in turn elected by the member states’ electorate).

The EU is democratic from top to bottom. It has significant separation of powers not unlike the American system.

It also reeks of hypocrisy when these critics complain about the EU’s democratic process, but not our own. We, after all, have an appointed House of Lords! (Not that I’m against the House of Lords: I think it’s a good idea in need of some reform. I’m just pointing out inconsistencies.)

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As for the claim that the EU is not accountable, I find that hard to believe seeing as to how the UK:

  1. Has a number of MEPs;
  2. Has Councilors;
  3. And regularly participates in negotiations.

The critics seem to be labouring under the impression that if the UK doesn’t always get its way, the EU must be unaccountable. Sorry to break it to you folks: it’s called a union. An accountable and democratic union means that everyone in the union has a say—NOT that one member dictates policy. That is known as ‘imperialism’.

But think of the Greeks!

This line of argument is the one taken by leftwing Eurosceptics. It is a stupid argument, of course, since it fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the EU towards individual member states.

Here’s the situation:

  • Successive Greek governments ran high deficits and failed to implement important structural reforms regarding industry, employment, pensions, and most importantly tax evasion.
  • Come the world financial crisis, Greek tourism went down the pan and the Greek economy went with it.
  • The Greek government asks the EU, and more specifically a few EU member states, for help.
  • Merkel, Sarkosy and EU top dogs grant Greece a rescue package composed of loans; however, Greece must undertake some reforms in order to get this rescue package. These reforms are intended to prevent a similar situation from occurring again.
  • The IMF also gives Greece loans, and again with strings attached.
  • The Greeks suffer rocketing unemployment, recession, and quite a few cuts to important government services.
  • The Greek economy worsens, Tsipiras is elected, and we know the rest.

The EU has no legal obligation to help Greece. I would say that it does have an economic and political obligation, because the economy of one member states affects other members states; and because, more broadly, the European Union requires a certain modicum of solidarity to function politically.

The EU leaders, including Merkel and Sarkosy, accepted this—they offered Greece a rescue package.

But to understand why the terms were so harsh, you have to see it from their perspective. The financial crisis affected nearly all developed economies. In the US, house prices collapsed, many were left unemployed, in debt and destitute. In Europe likewise, we were bailing out our banks, suffering recession and dealing with high unemployment. What could Merkel and co do? Their countries were faring comparatively well, but the key word here is comparatively. Merkel still had to bail out Deutsche Bank; Germany still saw recession. France saw high unemployment.

Could Merkel justify spending her own taxpayers’ all too finite money on other countries—especially when the other countries’ economic crisis was not her fault? Did she not need to ensure that her loans would be repaid, and that Greece and co. would undertake the necessary reforms to prevent such a disaster from happening again?

And remember Spain and Italy—their economies weren’t in as much shit as Greece’s, but they were much larger and therefore potentially more disastrous. Remember that Germany and co. gave loans and rescue packages to them as well.

In short, it is pure fantasy to suggest that Greece was a blameless victim of EU neoliberalism. The Greek economy was the fault of Greek governments over many years (along with the bankers’ insane gambling, but that’s a different kettle of fish). And the EU did in fact offer to help them; they could have just said ‘not our problem’.

Were Merkel’s austerian ‘reforms’ effective? Obviously not: Greece has seen almost no recovery and is suffering from political and economic chaos. But this is not because Merkel was an adherent of neoliberalism; her government, if you recall, renationalised the Federal post office and was quite happy to play nice with the unions.

Merkel may have been influenced by the economic establishment (remember: the IMF was all for austerity until recently) but her decision was not made on establishment economics. It was made on something even worse: household economics. Merkel believed that if the Greeks ‘tightened the belt,’ and paid off their debts (just like a household) it would be fine. This proved disastrous.

Nevertheless, it is not a fault of the EU. It is not even enough to damn Merkel—her actions were the result of ineptness, not malice.

And why am I so resolutely confident of this? Because it is in Germany’s interests to have a strong Greek economy—to suggest anything else would be ludicrous. A strong Greek economy means customers to buy Mercedes. A weak Greek economy means loans you may not get back, bad political PR, and political chaos in the EU.

But Norway and Switzerland do well!

This rather amusing comparison is sometimes trotted out by Eurosceptics. It has two fundamental problems. The first is that Switzerland and Norway are part of the EEA, and have to abide by EEA rules; this immediately makes the argument rather suspect. After all, Farage and co. are not suggesting we be part of the EEA, since that would involve free movement of labour.

The second problem is to do with cause and effect: Norway’s and Switzerland’s economic performance is not only partly because of being in the EEA, but also because Norway has large reserves of North Sea oil, and because Switzerland has been a banking haven for tax-dodging elites since the days of WW1. One can hardly point to their success and claim Britain can follow it.

But the EU is Rubbish

To be perfectly honest, I think that what this argument lacks more than anything is perspective. Political systems are almost by definition imperfect; the EU is one of the better examples. Somehow, it managed to turn a war-torn continent into a peaceful world power, and indeed an economic Great Power. There aren’t many political unions that can claim to have done that. (Oh, and if you’re going to be gloat about the EU economy, gloat on this: the EU’s GDP is $18T—the largest in the world. Per capita, the EU has a GDP of $36,447; the world average is $10,700.World Bank)

The truth of the matter is, the EU is in most respects a world model. It mostly succeeds in juggling the interests of 28 member countries—through linguistic, economic and historic differences—without becoming gridlocked in the fashion of the American Congress. It is democratic and has proportional representation; that’s more than the US can say, and certainly more than what China can say.

In light of this, the complaints leveled against the EU are positively trivial. Maximum power ratings on vacuum cleaners? Really? (And by the way, this EU directive led to more efficient and quieter vacuums that clean no less effectively. Europa)

I’m not going to bother with complaints against the EU court of human rights. While in some instances their rulings may be a bit short of common sense, it is nevertheless an institution that does a good deal to uphold human rights and to guard against state abuses.

The Immigration Question

And now, finally, to the main driving factor behind the whole Brexit affair.

Some Eurosceptics claim their worries are related to the other issues I’ve mentioned, and not specifically to immigration. In some cases—especially if the Eurosceptics are left-leaning—this is credible. In many cases, however, this is a smokescreen for the issue other Eurosceptics make front and centre.

Now: I am not going to discuss the numerous complexities of immigration in too much detail here. I don’t have the time and it is not the scope of the essay.

I will, however, say a few things. Firstly, the immigrants don’t seem to have any negative effects on the UK economy. They do not ‘steal our jobs’ since labour economics is not zero-sum game—what jobs the immigrants take, they make other jobs buying from supermarkets and cars and utilities and all the other million-and-one things we buy.

Secondly, many of these immigrants’ children—and sometimes even the immigrants themselves—do, for all intents and purposes, become British.

Thirdly, not all immigrants are equal. How many Polish suicide bombers have you heard of?

Finally, it seems quite silly to leave the world’s largest trading block, an immensely influential and effective democratic world power, and to forego all those benefits in tackling climate change and tax evasion... over immigration. Dare I say it seems rather xenophobic?

Conclusion

Inevitably, to satisfyingly address an issue like the EU referendum, I have had to go into quite a bit of detail. Nevertheless, I hope you found my essay informative, reasonably succinct, and perhaps even convincing.

My essay has two broad conclusions.

The first is that the EU is a Good Thing. It has been a powerful force for good in Europe—having turned a broken continent into a relatively prosperous continent, and having turned the formerly corrupt Eastern block into something resembling transparent government—and it will continue to be at the forefront of battling tax evasion, climate change, and many more issues besides.

The second is that the arguments against the EU are either outright false or not particularly convincing under scrutiny. The EU is not anti-democratic. It may have a few flaws, as does any political institution; but it is still far better than most.

In short: leaving the EU would be burning the orchard because of one bad apple.