A Socialist’s Case for EU Membership

Hail readers!

Previously, I promised that I would address the troublesome matter of the EU referendum. Well; here I am. My essay is one I shall attempt to keep reasonably brief, although the complexity of the matter will inevitably require substantial argument. No matter.

Broadly speaking, there are will be two main themes in my essay. Firstly, I will make a positive case for EU membership; and secondly, I will disabuse the Brexit case of its claims. But before that, allow me to ask a different question…

Why is the Referendum Important?

You may be wondering why, in the midst of my exam revision, and in the process of important work on my novel, I have decided to write on this. Well; this is because the EU referendum is very important—to me personally and to the country as a whole.

Firstly, allow me to be blunt: Brexit would be damaging to me personally. I hold Romanian citizenship; this confers to me both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that I can study in the Netherlands under EU tuition fees—typically around €2000/annum or so. If Brexit occurs, the significant number of British students intending to study in Holland would very likely have to pay non-EU fees. These are about three times the EU fees. (Suckers!)

Unfortunately, the current government is not very accommodating of foreign people. Theresa May, our dear Home Secretary, is already planning on deporting NHS nurses (as well as teachers and other non-EU workers) that earn less than £37,000 £35000 (Independent, apparently the exact figure has changed) a year—for no other reason than that they’re not EU/UK citizens. EU rules make it illegal for her to do the same to EU workers. However, if Britain were to leave, there’s no telling what she would do once free of her legal shackles.

If I were to leave for Holland, May’s antics would be of no personal consequence. If I intend to study here, however, I would be more concerned. Although it’s rather unlikely that she’ll be deporting me—considering that I’ve lived here since I was a child, speak English fluently and will be a university student soon—she and the Tory government may remove EU employment protections. This might affect my parents (who also hold Romanian citizenship although they do also hold Right to Work), it might affect me, and it will certainly many British workers who will see their already threadbare employment rights weakened further.

Anyway, the argument I will be presenting here will not be about personal circumstance, or indeed the people who will suffer if Brexit occurs (although there will be many, both British and non-British, they will be a minority).

No: my argument will be about Britain as a whole. And more importantly still, about Europe as a whole.

The Case for Bremain

If you haven’t already realised, I don’t think very highly of Brexit. In fact, I think it’s a staggeringly stupid idea—on par with austerity and selling off council housing. Maybe worse (and that’s saying something).

But why, you wonder, is this?

Firstly, I’ll say that I am not in the minority. This is not to employ an ad populum argument; it is merely to highlight the fact that Brexit, and more broadly Euroscepticism, is actually a minority view held by people convinced that others share their view. I don’t just mean in Britain—although EU membership is advocated by both the trade unions and big business (a rare feat!), the majority of small businesses, most political parties, and the majority of the population when polled. I also mean in the rest of Europe: in most EU countries, Euroscepticism is the view of about 20% of the population; the rest of the population thinks breaking up the EU is madness. Even the Americans think Brexit is a bad idea.

Anyway, back to Britain. None of this is not to say that Brexit is impossible—it’s because of a thing called differential turnout. The majority of people may agree to EU membership as a whole (leaving aside one or two specific issues) but they may not bother to vote. The leave brigade, on the other hand, is obsessed with leaving.

Once you understand that Britain is in serious danger of letting a minority make a decision affecting the entire country, you begin to understand why Brexit is a bad idea on purely democratic terms.

You may of course argue that people have the right to vote and that not voting is a choice they make. However, this argument is rather naive for two reasons. Firstly, some of us actually don’t have the right to vote even though the referendum affects us a great deal (more than anyone, perhaps). Secondly, the reality is that for a democratic system to actually be meaningfully democratic, people have to vote—it’s a constitutional responsibility.

Leaving this aside, why does Britain need to stay in the EU and why is the Leave campaign wrong?

Trade

The economics of Bremain have been hashed out a number of times. They are not, in my opinion, the most compelling reason to remain; but nor can they be ignored, and it would be silly for me—an economics student—to fail to address them in this essay.

Let’s start with an obvious one: trade. The rEU accounts for half of the UK’s exports:

Note: you may need to allow your browser to display HTTP content over HTTPS in order to view the above graphic. If you can’t, see the original link

If the UK left, it could see a return to before EU conditions—to tariffs, regulations, quotas, and other measures inhibiting exports. The UK could renegotiate its trade deals, but anyone who has studied the history of trade deals will tell you that such negotiations are likely to take decades.

It is also rather unlikely that the UK could negotiate terms that are as favourable as they are now, let alone more favourable. The EU isn’t stupid: it knows that favourable terms under Brexit would bolster similar isolationalist parties in other countries, like FN in France. If the UK leaves, you can count against favourable terms.

Also, look at Switzerland and Norway: they still have to agree to EEA regulations—and these in fact make up the bulk of EU regulations (about 80% according to most estimates). And: they have no say in how these regulations are decided. They have no MEPs, no commissioners, and nobody on the European Council.

It is also extremely unlikely that the UK could realistically avoid trading with Europe. For one, geographic proximity is still a reality when it comes to trade. Shipping heavy objects or time-sensitive goods vast distances does add to cost.

But more importantly, the UK simply wouldn’t have the clout to negotiate the kind of trade deals the EU can. It is a simple question of numbers. The largest and strongest economies have the greatest bargaining power and secure the best deals. The US has a GDP of $17.4T (that’s trillion); China’s is $10T; and the EU’s is the largest, at. $18.5T. The UK? Our GDP is $3T. That’s a fraction of other nations (All stats from Trading Economics, 2016 data.)

Nevertheless, there is more to this fiasco than trade. Yes, trade is nice, but trade alone doesn’t have a massive overall impact on the UK economy.

There are other economic issues that are more significant, however. One such is to do with standards and regulations. Now, for anyone not familiar, the EU has numerous regulatory powers when it comes to what goods can be traded in the EU and how. The EU sets standards on car safety, food safety, and on how consumer goods should be built. It sets consumer rights; firms operating in the EU know their legal duties and know that the EU will enforce them.

The EU, believe it or not, makes consumer goods cheaper. This is because firms spend a not-insignificant amount of money on testing and meeting all of these regulations. (Obviously this is more expensive than no regulations, but do you honestly want your hairdryer to electrocute you? Do you want to be sure that the food you buy at the supermarket is safe to eat?) Now: in the instance where a multinational organisation like the EU sets standards, every firm operating in Europe can have one standard to worry about. Not 28.

If the UK were to leave, consumer prices would begin to rise; it is simply the nature of standards to diverge. The UK would have one standard, the EU another, and any firms intending to sell goods in the UK will have to charge more in order to pay for their testing and possible redesign.

Other economic arguments centre around immigration. These I won’t address because there’s no significant evidence either way.

Anyway; it’s pretty obvious that Brexit would have economic consequences. Only the most obstinate Eurosceptics deny this. It is the view of the vast majority of economists. But as I say: this has to do with more than just economics. Let me present some big-picture arguments for the EU.

Global Warming

Anthropogenic global warming is scientific consensus. (See this Meta Analysis published by Skeptical Science.) I’m not going to bother debating this, since it’s not worthy of any debate. Nor is there need for convincing—the vast majority of the people of Europe accept it.

Now the question becomes: how do we tackle anthropogenic climate change? Obviously this is a complex topic. But a few aspects do emerge.

Global warming is caused by greenhouse gases (GHGs) like CO2 and methane. Reducing these emissions is extremely challenging from a technical standpoint; generating energy, and storing it for use in transport applications, from non-polluting sources is difficult. Wind power is somewhat variable, and unable to provide all of our energy demands—although it is relatively cost-effective. Solar power is promising but is currently expensive. Carbon-neutral resources like rapeseed oil are limited by supply. But you know what? These problems are gradually being resolved.

Nevertheless, alternative energy tends to have a few key problems. One of these is cost: although the cost of these technologies is generally not great, the cost difference between them and a polluting technology is significant enough to be political.

That’s the thing about global warming; it is political as well as technological. And when it comes to the political, countries have shown that they are willing to pollute if it means obtaining an economic advantage over countries that do not pollute.

And this is where the EU comes in. Why? Because the EU is supranational; it can actually enforce regulations on member states. (Do I need remind anyone of the Kyoto protocol?)

Indeed, the EU has been a key driver in tackling climate change. It has subscribed to some of the toughest climate targets of any large economy (Europa); and of the large economies, it has seen one of the largest reductions in CO2 since 1990 (Eurostat). This is better than the US—which saw no significant decrease (EPA)—despite per-capita emissions being lower to begin with.

Furthermore, the EU has an effect that is less easy to quantify but no less significant: it is a role model for the rest of the world. It shows that emissions can be cut, and in particular, that Westerners are not hypocrites. This is important; China has long complained by hypocrisy on the part of the US. It can’t use that argument against the EU. Indeed, one may plausibly claim that the EU contributed to China’s recent drive towards decarbonisation.

A few Eurosceptics, particularly those left-inclined, may wonder whether the UK could achieve similar things without the EU. But this attitude is rather naïve, for several reasons. Firstly, the EU is much larger than the UK; if the UK remains a member state, it has greater power to influence other member states (which it would lack were it to leave) and it can influence the world by helping set EU foreign policy.

Secondly, as I’ve pointed out before, there is a conflict of interest here between states. Suppose, for argument’s sake, the UK were to support lowering carbon emission. Now suppose that the EU did not in fact exist. If we, say, introduced tough regulations on industrial pollution—would other countries follow? Or would firms pack up and move towards countries with more lax regulation, harming us and benefitting them?

And most of all, would we be able to continue our political support for CO2 reduction in these circumstances? If we can’t, global warming will continue. And that hurts all of us.

International Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion

The Panama leaks, and many instances of global tax evasion before it, should give us an indication of what kind of money is being laundered; what effect that money would have had on our deficit-enduring, cash-strapped governments; and how difficult it is to deal with tax evasion of this sort alone.

The EU has undertaken numerous projects to combat tax fraud, evasion and avoidance. One example is the recently-approved bill to force multinationals to release country-by-country financial reports—a move which our own government initially resisted. Considering our own dear Prime Ministers’ interesting operations in Panama, this may not come as a surprise.

In any case, the situation here is much the same as with climate change. The EU is big; it can secure deals with tax havens like Monaco and Andorra (Europa). And once more, the EU is a stalwart against what, in economic parlance, is known as ‘fiscal competition’. In other words, if we—for whatever reason—decide to raise taxes on income, VAT or (most importantly) corporate tax, other European nations cannot take advantage of us. This is because of numerous EU laws, such as the minimum 15% VAT threshold and various regulations regarding corporate practice within the EU.

The EU has also clamped down on various clever tax avoidance schemes. One has personally affected me.

You see, some months ago, Amazon—being quartered in Luxembourg—was able to pay 3% VAT on ebooks sold within its marketplace. Then the EU brought in regulations requiring digital goods to be subject to taxation in the country of purchase. Now people have to pay 20% VAT when they buy the Necromancer, instead of 3%. And the UK government gets the money, not Luxembourg. I may not be pleased, my readers may not be pleased, but we all have to pay tax.

To quote Jeremy Corbyn: there cannot be one rule for the rich and another for everyone else.

Think of the Big Picture

Finally, there’s the old bugbear of national security to think about.

If the UK were to leave, the EU and the UK would weaken their ability to influence world events. Putin would be delighted: the EU is his worst nightmare. It’s right on his doorstep; and it has allowed several Eastern European countries (Romania, Poland, Bulgaria) to escape Russian political, economic and military dominance.

Of course there’s NATO. But NATO isn’t an economic union; it’s not even a political union outside of the purely military aspect of it. NATO hasn’t bought human rights to Europe—or at least not beyond overthrowing a few unsavoury dictators (cough Milošević cough) NATO members don’t have to sign the ECHR, they don’t have to have strong democratic government, and most of all: NATO can’t provide trade deals and investment to nations hoping to escape Putin’s claws. The Eastern block can attest to this.

Also, the EU is a military alliance distinct from NATO; this is important if you happen to be, say, the Ukraine.

So the EU is undeniably beneficial to Europe. ‘But what about Britain!’ some of you may cry.

Now this is where it gets interesting. Firstly, it’s worth realising that the problems inherent in a military and political union can be much worse than under the EU. Among EU nations, Britain is an equal. NATO? The US is king there.

But let’s consider more than just the military. What of other diplomatic, legal and economic considerations?

I will not deny that the EU acts on the interests of all of Europe; if this occasionally conflicts with the interests of the UK, so be it. Indeed, the EU’s interests frequently do conflict with many other member states aside from Britain.

But you know what? If the EU didn’t exist, we would all suffer. If every country in Europe simply pursued its own interests, Europe would be fragmented and weak. Strength is in co-operation; and sometimes, one has own to accept an unfavourable stance on one issue in order to accept a favourable stance on a dozen other issues.

This concept, however, seems to elude the Brexit brigade.

The Case Against Brexit: Myth and Fatuous Argument

Let me now address the many claims made against the EU, and why they don’t hold up to scrutiny.

The EU is Undemocratic/Unaccountable

This claim is made by both left and right Eurosceptics, and it’s preposterous in both cases. The EU:

• Has a parliament elected by elections held in member states (they don’t call them the European elections for nothing!) and composed of MEPs belonging to national parties—as my own party frequently reminds me in news bulletins;
• It has a commission selected by the parliament, held accountable by the parliament, and incapable of passing laws without the parliament’s support. The commission is like the cabinet of the UK government; it is selected by the parliament in the same way that the leader and cabinet is selected by the party. The only difference is that the commission has more limited powers than do our government ministers;

• Thirdly and finally, it also has the Council of Ministers, which is composed of the government ministers of each individual member state (who are in turn elected by the member states’ electorate).

The EU is democratic from top to bottom. It has significant separation of powers not unlike the American system.

It also reeks of hypocrisy when these critics complain about the EU’s democratic process, but not our own. We, after all, have an appointed House of Lords! (Not that I’m against the House of Lords: I think it’s a good idea in need of some reform. I’m just pointing out inconsistencies.)

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As for the claim that the EU is not accountable, I find that hard to believe seeing as to how the UK:

1. Has a number of MEPs;
2. Has Councilors;
3. And regularly participates in negotiations.

The critics seem to be labouring under the impression that if the UK doesn’t always get its way, the EU must be unaccountable. Sorry to break it to you folks: it’s called a union. An accountable and democratic union means that everyone in the union has a say—NOT that one member dictates policy. That is known as ‘imperialism’.

But think of the Greeks!

This line of argument is the one taken by leftwing Eurosceptics. It is a stupid argument, of course, since it fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the EU towards individual member states.

Here’s the situation:

• Successive Greek governments ran high deficits and failed to implement important structural reforms regarding industry, employment, pensions, and most importantly tax evasion.
• Come the world financial crisis, Greek tourism went down the pan and the Greek economy went with it.
• The Greek government asks the EU, and more specifically a few EU member states, for help.
• Merkel, Sarkosy and EU top dogs grant Greece a rescue package composed of loans; however, Greece must undertake some reforms in order to get this rescue package. These reforms are intended to prevent a similar situation from occurring again.
• The IMF also gives Greece loans, and again with strings attached.
• The Greeks suffer rocketing unemployment, recession, and quite a few cuts to important government services.
• The Greek economy worsens, Tsipiras is elected, and we know the rest.

The EU has no legal obligation to help Greece. I would say that it does have an economic and political obligation, because the economy of one member states affects other members states; and because, more broadly, the European Union requires a certain modicum of solidarity to function politically.

The EU leaders, including Merkel and Sarkosy, accepted this—they offered Greece a rescue package.

But to understand why the terms were so harsh, you have to see it from their perspective. The financial crisis affected nearly all developed economies. In the US, house prices collapsed, many were left unemployed, in debt and destitute. In Europe likewise, we were bailing out our banks, suffering recession and dealing with high unemployment. What could Merkel and co do? Their countries were faring comparatively well, but the key word here is comparatively. Merkel still had to bail out Deutsche Bank; Germany still saw recession. France saw high unemployment.

Could Merkel justify spending her own taxpayers’ all too finite money on other countries—especially when the other countries’ economic crisis was not her fault? Did she not need to ensure that her loans would be repaid, and that Greece and co. would undertake the necessary reforms to prevent such a disaster from happening again?

And remember Spain and Italy—their economies weren’t in as much shit as Greece’s, but they were much larger and therefore potentially more disastrous. Remember that Germany and co. gave loans and rescue packages to them as well.

In short, it is pure fantasy to suggest that Greece was a blameless victim of EU neoliberalism. The Greek economy was the fault of Greek governments over many years (along with the bankers’ insane gambling, but that’s a different kettle of fish). And the EU did in fact offer to help them; they could have just said ‘not our problem’.

Were Merkel’s austerian ‘reforms’ effective? Obviously not: Greece has seen almost no recovery and is suffering from political and economic chaos. But this is not because Merkel was an adherent of neoliberalism; her government, if you recall, renationalised the Federal post office and was quite happy to play nice with the unions.

Merkel may have been influenced by the economic establishment (remember: the IMF was all for austerity until recently) but her decision was not made on establishment economics. It was made on something even worse: household economics. Merkel believed that if the Greeks ‘tightened the belt,’ and paid off their debts (just like a household) it would be fine. This proved disastrous.

Nevertheless, it is not a fault of the EU. It is not even enough to damn Merkel—her actions were the result of ineptness, not malice.

And why am I so resolutely confident of this? Because it is in Germany’s interests to have a strong Greek economy—to suggest anything else would be ludicrous. A strong Greek economy means customers to buy Mercedes. A weak Greek economy means loans you may not get back, bad political PR, and political chaos in the EU.

But Norway and Switzerland do well!

This rather amusing comparison is sometimes trotted out by Eurosceptics. It has two fundamental problems. The first is that Switzerland and Norway are part of the EEA, and have to abide by EEA rules; this immediately makes the argument rather suspect. After all, Farage and co. are not suggesting we be part of the EEA, since that would involve free movement of labour.

The second problem is to do with cause and effect: Norway’s and Switzerland’s economic performance is not only partly because of being in the EEA, but also because Norway has large reserves of North Sea oil, and because Switzerland has been a banking haven for tax-dodging elites since the days of WW1. One can hardly point to their success and claim Britain can follow it.

But the EU is Rubbish

To be perfectly honest, I think that what this argument lacks more than anything is perspective. Political systems are almost by definition imperfect; the EU is one of the better examples. Somehow, it managed to turn a war-torn continent into a peaceful world power, and indeed an economic Great Power. There aren’t many political unions that can claim to have done that. (Oh, and if you’re going to be gloat about the EU economy, gloat on this: the EU’s GDP is $18T—the largest in the world. Per capita, the EU has a GDP of $36,447; the world average is $10,700.World Bank)

The truth of the matter is, the EU is in most respects a world model. It mostly succeeds in juggling the interests of 28 member countries—through linguistic, economic and historic differences—without becoming gridlocked in the fashion of the American Congress. It is democratic and has proportional representation; that’s more than the US can say, and certainly more than what China can say.

In light of this, the complaints leveled against the EU are positively trivial. Maximum power ratings on vacuum cleaners? Really? (And by the way, this EU directive led to more efficient and quieter vacuums that clean no less effectively. Europa)

I’m not going to bother with complaints against the EU court of human rights. While in some instances their rulings may be a bit short of common sense, it is nevertheless an institution that does a good deal to uphold human rights and to guard against state abuses.

The Immigration Question

And now, finally, to the main driving factor behind the whole Brexit affair.

Some Eurosceptics claim their worries are related to the other issues I’ve mentioned, and not specifically to immigration. In some cases—especially if the Eurosceptics are left-leaning—this is credible. In many cases, however, this is a smokescreen for the issue other Eurosceptics make front and centre.

Now: I am not going to discuss the numerous complexities of immigration in too much detail here. I don’t have the time and it is not the scope of the essay.

I will, however, say a few things. Firstly, the immigrants don’t seem to have any negative effects on the UK economy. They do not ‘steal our jobs’ since labour economics is not zero-sum game—what jobs the immigrants take, they make other jobs buying from supermarkets and cars and utilities and all the other million-and-one things we buy.

Secondly, many of these immigrants’ children—and sometimes even the immigrants themselves—do, for all intents and purposes, become British.

Thirdly, not all immigrants are equal. How many Polish suicide bombers have you heard of?

Finally, it seems quite silly to leave the world’s largest trading block, an immensely influential and effective democratic world power, and to forego all those benefits in tackling climate change and tax evasion... over immigration. Dare I say it seems rather xenophobic?

Conclusion

Inevitably, to satisfyingly address an issue like the EU referendum, I have had to go into quite a bit of detail. Nevertheless, I hope you found my essay informative, reasonably succinct, and perhaps even convincing.

My essay has two broad conclusions.

The first is that the EU is a Good Thing. It has been a powerful force for good in Europe—having turned a broken continent into a relatively prosperous continent, and having turned the formerly corrupt Eastern block into something resembling transparent government—and it will continue to be at the forefront of battling tax evasion, climate change, and many more issues besides.

The second is that the arguments against the EU are either outright false or not particularly convincing under scrutiny. The EU is not anti-democratic. It may have a few flaws, as does any political institution; but it is still far better than most.

In short: leaving the EU would be burning the orchard because of one bad apple.

Jeremy Corbyn: Not so Unelectable

Owing to substantial interest from my readers, I am bumping up this post—and including additional data. If you wish to comment, please do so below; and apologies for my lackadaisical blogging efforts as of late. The Ark is growing steadily...

A strange malady seems to have overtaken the Labour party. Some call it ‘Corbynmania’; others call it, more simply, ‘madness’.

But most call it ‘hope’. And it is indeed the majority who decided the fate of the Labour Party that Saturday—let us not forget that. So: what are we to do?

Certain wings of the party—notable proponents include Simon Danczuk, Chuka Umunna and Liz Kendall—are reluctant to move forward. ‘This is madness; we will be annihilated; what disaster has befallen us!’ they claim.

Absurd as it may seem, their claims require careful consideration in order to be proven, or—as I will show—disproven. And we cannot ignore them; if not for preserving ‘party unity’ then for a more simple reason: they may have a point. If Jeremy cannot keep the party together, if his policies are not workable, or if—most importantly of all—he cannot convince the wider electorate to vote for them, then the Labour party must be prepared.

A relative minority of Corbyn supporters have expressed support for the idea that, even if Corbyn doesn’t do very well, he would at least have stood fast to principle. To this I say: rubbish. Power without principle is anarchy; but principle without power is a pipe dream. If some form of compromise is indeed necessary, we owe it to the people we represent—not just the disabled and the poor, but also the millions of middle-income people fooled by the Tories—to win power.

But are such grave compromises really necessary, and is Corbyn the unelectable disaster some profess him to be? Let’s take a closer look.

Renationalisation etc.

One of the matters that Corbyn is rather popular on—despite claims made by ill-informed media commentators—is in his idea to renationalise the railways, the Royal Mail, and to a lesser degree the energy companies. I previously quoted polls conducted by YouGov in my analysis of Socialism, but it is worth re-iterating them:

Interestingly, we see that not only are Corbyn’s policies popular among his own party and other vaguely left-leaning parties like the Lib Dems (as well as the SNP, etc.); but that they are popular in general, and significantly by UKIP voters and even quite a few Tory voters.

So: Corbyn’s not going to have any trouble pushing that through.

A similar story may be found with regards to renationalising Mail and Energy:

So, on the basis of public opinion, Corbyn is not going to have any difficulty finding supporters for his renationalisation policies. However, there is another question to be had here: is it actually a good idea to renationalise, and if so, how can this be achieved?

Let’s start with rail. The case is overwhelming: since privatisation, railway ticket prices have increased 22% (adjusted for inflation); subsidies have increased, but most of the money has gone directly into shareholder’s pockets; and the UK has rail prices that are as much as double those of nationalised European nations. (We Own It)

Furthermore, it is estimated that simply by not having to pay shareholders, the government could chop off 18% from ticket prices. (ibid.)

Nor can it be argued that the railway companies provide better service: the average age of the trains has gone up; and to add insult to injury—they are more overcrowded, too, with only a 3% increase in carriage capacity to meet a 60% rise in demand. (ibid.)

Renationalising them isn’t complicated either. The UK state still owns much of the rail infrastructure, and the companies run the trains on franchises; when they expire, the state can run them once more.

The energy companies—known collectively as the Big Six, and owning over 95% of the marketshare—have also increased their prices by between 40% and 20% (for gas and electricity respectively) since 2007, despite seeing a tenth-fold rise in profits within the same period. (We Own It) The latter is particularly damning: while the global price of gas varied significantly at that time, the substantial rise is down mainly to companies pocketing a healthy profit.

Indeed, Corporate Watch even calculated that nationalising the energy companies would serve to bring savings of £150 a year to each household, on average. (CorporateWatch)

But how are we to nationalise them? This is where Corbyn gets into some difficulty. Buying the companies at market rate is out of the question: it would cost £185B (TheGuardian) He could theoretically impose price freezes, regulation on passing down the cost of falling gas prices, and so on; this would lower their stock value, allowing these companies to be bought cheaply.

That, however, is no way to run good government. More likely, Corbyn can attempt a municipal system of state ownership: municipalities can run their own power stations, and charge their customers accordingly. Alternately, the state could simply buy one company, and let the others go out of business. That’s capitalism for you.

Welfare, And Other Tricky Matters

This is perhaps where Corbyn may fall. The public’s opinion on welfare seems rather divided:

However, the situation is not so simple as it looks. For one, a lot of opposition to welfare in general stems from certain assumptions—apocryphal ones:

The amount of misinformation presented to the public, and supported by the Tories—implicitly or explicitly—is remarkable. One woman believed the Tories to be the party of the poor, and Labour... not so. She also apparently believed that the rich shouldn’t pay more tax—evidently the trade-off was not clear: if you support this, you will pay more tax yourself, or you will face cuts to the NHS. (In fact, the Tories have done just that—by scrapping tax credits.)

A pair of women believed that the Labour party supported the ‘scroungers’—people who don’t want to work, and want to stay on benefits.

Liz Kendall was right to point out that the Labour party has a serious problem: the public believes Labour to be the ‘something for nothing’ party. But Kendall’s response wasn’t the correct one. The solution is not to feed into this nonsense; not to agree that the ‘scroungers’ are stealing the taxpayer’s money (fact check: fradulent benefit claims make up 0.7% of the welfare budget (ONS)) or that Britain is facing some imminent crisis on welfare.

Because Britain is facing a welfare crisis, and that’s the one created by Iain Duncan Smith: his regime is responsible for the deaths of thousands. (TheGuardian)

Still, there are turbulent times ahead. Getting Labour’s message out to the public, and killing these apocryphal rumours where they stand—well, it won’t be easy. Perhaps it would be easier to compromise. But it wouldn’t be the right thing to do; at least not if compromise requires near total capitulation, as seems to have befallen Kendall.

Trident, NATO, and Other Matters

I shan’t be discussing these matters overly much. I have already stated that I disagree with Corbyn’s foreign policy, on my Socialism essay; but I’m not so presumptuous as to think the public are wise enough to agree with me. The media commentariat evidently needs to get out more—the polls tell a story very different from their narrative...

The public are opposed to extending the bombing campaign on Syria... Source: The Independent

Jonathan Knott, over at OpenDemocracy, is also worth quoting with regards to how much voters actually care about NATO and Trident...

So 55% supported retaining nuclear weapons in some form. But given that before they were asked specifically about Trident, about a quarter (23%) didn’t know whether the UK had any nuclear weapons or plans to replace them, it’s hard to argue that this is a high priority for voters.

This ComRes poll also has an interesting tale to tell... Apparently, voters mostly agreed with the statement: ‘Nuclear weapons are too expensive for governments to maintain.’

The public also seems quite amenable on other aspects of Corbyn’s policy, including support for the minimum wage and rent controls...

Immigration

Readers have enquired as to why I omitted a section on immigration; the answer to this is: it simply did not cross my mind at the time. I am, generally speaking, not particularly concerned about immigration—nevertheless, as with many issues, I do not presume to be in the majority. The public’s views on immigration are somewhat complex; it’s worth taking a look at a lot of the data.

Firstly, the picture very generally appears to be that the public feels negatively about immigration—in economic terms particularly:

(It seems almost superfluous to mention that nearly all economists—like those from the Imperial College, or the National Institute for Economic Research—have come to the conclusion that immigration is positive for the UK economy; opinion triumphs knowledge, it seems.)

Nevertheless, the picture is more complex than this. For one, more people believe that refugees should be allowed in as opposed to not (48% versus 38%); further, more people believe that NHS staff from abroad should be allowed in as opposed to not. (YouGov).

As usual, I feel it necessary to bring some facts to bear. A lot of people are under the impression that immigration has dramatically increased in recent years, for example:

With Farage’s and Cameron’s rhetoric, it’s not hard to see why. But as is sadly all too often the case, this is not what is actually happening—at least not so simply.

Source: Migration Watch

While net migration has been unusually high this year and the year before, it was significantly lower between 2011 and 2013; lower even than the years previous. Why? Finding the exact causes would require more words than I’ve time for—but, likely, we are seeing both statistical variation (notice the variation in the early 2000s and in the 80s?) and the effect of one of the largest refugee crises in recent history. The NHS also saw significant shortages of qualified medical personnel, which perhaps explains another part of the equation.

So: how would Corbyn fare in this matter? It’s hard to say. Corbyn is pro-immigration, yes; but if he would be able to convince others of his point of view (as good politicians are meant to) then this may not prove a problem. Further, it is hard to determine exactly how this would sway an election result—a lot of people are concerned about immigration, but are they not also concerned about unemployment, financial security, and housing? And what exactly are the other parties going to be offering in that dimension?

UKIP only won one seat—so voting for them is unlikely to result in any meaningful change—and their policy on the economy ranges from the merely very stupid (like flat tax: if you earn £16K and have lost your tax credits, prepare to pay more tax—just like the banker on £150K!) to the absolutely moronic (like scrapping the NHS—or has Farage changed his mind yet again?) The Tories are trying to make millions of people £££ worse off, and their housing policy is responsible both for the enormous increase in house prices (by subsidising demand, and and not regulating banks) and for the shortage (by not allowing councils to build houses, among other things). The Liberal Democrats promised to do a lot of things in 2010, like getting rid of tuition fees. Instead they tripled them. If you can’t trust them to fulfil their most important promise, why trust them with anything else?

But I digress. On immigration, Corbyn is, for once, in the minority. Nevertheless, there are a number of other issues to contend with—not to mention the vagaries of the FPTP system.

To Conclude

This post has been rather detailed and indeed rather lengthy. But a clear picture emerges here: Corbyn is not unelectable—his policies are popular, especially on the economy (the living wage, rent controls, and renationalisation) while even his more contentious foreign policy is far from the fringe position the commentariat makes it out to be. Indeed, Corbyn is more often that not with the majority.

Is this to say the sailing will be smooth? No. As I said before, Corbyn isn’t a man full of charisma; his ‘authenticity’ may go down well, but he is less than prime-ministerly. Don’t think this matters? Look at Miliband. Many of his policies were popular too, but he failed to win; if he had possessed better personal ratings, we (probably) wouldn’t have a Tory government.

Nor will things be easy on welfare: there is a widespread misconception of what the situation is really like, and on what the Labour party stands for. And let’s not forget the parliamentary Labour party, too; there’s quite a bit of opposition there, sometimes with reason (in the case of printing money, or leaving NATO, or on Eurotoxicity) but not always—as Danczuk and his ilk show.

Still, there’s reason to hope. The country is far from the right-leaning, NATO loving, Tory-lite image that the likes of Rafael Behr and Jonathan Freedland would have you believe. The Tories are a minority, after all; and many Tory voters aren’t Osbornomicists—but people deceived by misinformation on welfare, on immigration, and on what the Tory party really is. (Hint: they lowered inheritance tax for millionaires and cut tax credits for working people. They sold off the Royal Mail at knock-off prices to their chums in the City. Who the hell do you think they are?)

So to all this, I say: Labour, get ready to fight. Blairites, shut up—or Labour won’t get elected, and it’ll be your fault. Corbyn? Get a tie.

On Sequels and Politics

‘Alex!’ you cry; ‘wherever have you been?’ you enquire forlornly. Rest assured that—though occupied with many an hour of math homework, courtesy to my charming math teacher—I do nevertheless have a great deal to discuss. First up: politics. Yes, it’s that time of the year.

Politics

Though an inclement beast, my school has for once been daring: it has organised a ‘mock election’ in which candidates (that is, me; and a few others) must campaign in order to win the student vote.

Presently, there are eight parties involved: moi, representing the Reason Party (of course); the Tories; the Lib Dems; Labour; along with the Communists, the Greens, the kippies (may Hell feast upon their empty souls), and a joke party called ‘4Uture’.

We firstly began with a debate. This proved a fortuitous moment in my rise to power: the kippies were promptly humiliated (claiming that an NHS policy cost us three times the entire NHS budget is bound to do that), the Tories’ policies were—despite a rather poignant appeal by the party candidate—revealed to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor (alas the Communists were instrumental in that particular coup), and Labour droned repetitively and without the slightest inkling of conviction.

Then we were asked to deliver a speech in front of the entire school. This proved a somewhat daunting proposition—the audience is 1100 strong after all—but I’m pleased to say that I and my peers delivered an excellent performance.

The kippies made another spurious claim (the EU apparently costs us £120B—the figure is closer to £12B), the Tories busied themselves with trite insults against the other parties, Labour… was Labour. The Lib Dem’s performance was more solid, along with, of course, the Reds. The winner of this particular battle will likely be between the Reds, the Lib Dems, and myself—though the Tories, Greens and unfortunately the kippies will likely remain in the game.

You, however, probably don’t read this wonderful blog of mine purely for my antics. Thus, here’s a bit of serious analysis for you.

Proposition A: ‘The Tories believe in the good of all, including the less well off, for they are the party of aspiration.’

Ironically this is actually genuinely believed by a lot of Tories. Indeed, the Tory candidate made an impassioned appeal; having lived in a council house, he said, he was not a man of the rich—but he did believe in aspiration; in aiming high rather than stooping low.

Unfortunately, while the Tories may believe this is what their party accomplishes, the truth is rather different.

Firstly, the desire to be successful is usually not what is in short supply. We would all wish to be successful; to earn well, to provide for our human wants, desires, and needs. But people are not poor—or indeed merely not particularly successful—for lack of desire. No: the problem is that people can’t fulfill their dreams. It’s all well and nilly to say that tax incentivises entrepreneurs; but no one is going to be an entrepreneur if they have to choose between eating and heating.

And that is the great contradiction in Tory thinking. People want to be successful—of course they do. And having to live in a smaller mansion or buying a Mercedes instead of a Bentley isn’t likely to make them any less keen.

But if people cannot go to a good school; if people cannot attend university, if they do not have a stable environment… if, were they to fail (and it is conveniently forgotten that 65% of small businesses go bust within 3 years, and that liquidation often leads to debt) they would be without help… then they can never succeed.

In some instances, there is a poverty of ambition. Pupils doing badly at school often do badly not because they are stupid; but because they have no hope. If you have lived a life in poverty, success seems to belong to another galaxy.

But lowering taxes won’t make these kids sit up and learn. For that matter, hiring more teachers probably won’t either. The problem is that Britain suffers from a perpetuating cycle of poverty.

Proposition B: ‘Europe is the cause of Britain’s ills.’

This is essentially the entire premise by which the kippies argue from; often they do so implicitly, but if you look at their complaints—immigration, EU funding—you’ll quickly realise this is their bête noire.

But let us examine the veracity of so grandiose a statement. Chiefly among ‘Britain’s Ills’ would be the Credit Crunch of 2007 onwards. That, however, was instigated by the collapse of the Lehman brothers (remember them?) after which much of the banking system went down with them. This of course was caused by two things: banking—particularly when it involves the trade of other debts—is a risky business; and of course, the banks lent massive mortgages to people who never had an icicle’s chance in Hell of paying them off.

That is why Britain is in a financial crisis. The problem has very little to do with bureaucrats in Brussels and everything to do with greed and irresponsibility at home.

Neither can Greece be blamed. Greece’s economy is small; bailouts, when shared among Germany, France, the UK and other EU nations amount to little; and most of these bailouts, sadly, need to be repaid. (So the creditors don’t actually lose any money.) What’s more, Greece actually suffered in no small part because of the crisis caused by the UK: Greece has a significant tourist economy, and one that was badly affected by the British credit crunch—us being the single largest nationality of visiting tourists.[1]

This is not to say that Greece is without blame for having such a tourist-dependent economy. It is also true that Greece’s tourism profits were unsustainable—since the money British tourists used to pay for those holidays was somewhat based on credit card loans that needed to be paid off eventually (and painfully, as in now).

Greece also has a major sovereign debt problem—due primarily to the corruption of former governments. That, however, is an entirely different kettle of fish. But it does lead me onto proposition three.

Proposition C: ‘Britain is in debt; we must eliminate the deficit; we must pay off the debt.’

Some of the greatest lies are half-truths, and this certainly is a half truth. (Though probably not the greatest of lies.)

Firstly, some data:

Firstly, note that we were far, far more in debt post-WW2 than we are now. The debt reached 240% of GDP in 1945, and is currently at 80% (edit: 90% as of latest figures). Thus, to state that Britain ‘must’ pay off the debt (or some terrible fate is imminent) is false: we have sustained much greater levels of debt in the past than we have now. And, if you’ll care to observe, we were able to pay all of it off. (The small increases you see post 1975 is from new debt.)

But how far are we in debt now, why are we in debt, and is this a concern?

With regards to the cause, the bank bailouts cost us £124B [2] in the immediate term (though at its peak ten times that amount was offered as guarantees) and another £5B per year in interest. A ballpark figure of around £150B may thus be derived.

The UK GDP is around £1500B as of 2014 [3] so these bailouts have added around 10% to the total debt. However, post-2007 sovereign debt increased by 40%. Where is the other 30% coming from?

That is likely due to the not-insignificant deficit the government has shored up: averaging around £90B post-2007 [4], which makes up most of the rest.

So, let’s recap: Britain is in much lower debt that in 1945, has less debt than the US and quite a lot less than Japan (neither economy is doing especially badly), and most of the debt is from a budget deficit, with some from bank bailouts. The final question remains: is this a concern?

Well, it is a concern insomuch as 80% GDP public debt is not small, and in that it is increasing—albeit less rapidly than immediately after the Great Recession (as it is misleadingly known; the 1930s one is much more accurately described as such, while this fiasco is proving to be one of long-term stagnation).

But is this an immediate, and terrible concern? No. Debt levels have been much higher previously, and it did not crush our economy (yes, France and Germany’s post-War boom was considerably more pronounced, but then they were either not as badly damaged or got more help). Indeed, Keynesians would propose—quite reasonably—that we keep borrowing to help us initiate a growth period, and pay the debt when we are more able to do so.

This is not entirely without flaw (it is unlikely, for example, that we will have the same growth as we did in the post-war period, since we are not rebuilding) but it is certainly quite misleading to portray the current debt problem as a bomb waiting to explode.

Okay: enough with the economics lesson.

Why Do People Believe This?

I believe I have bored you long enough (I have news on a sequel!) but do humour me for this last, important point.

People believe what they want to believe. The Tories ultimately act out of greed, and selfishness, but also because many are well-meaning but mislead. Frankly, lower taxation for the wealthy or even middle class will spell very bad news for the many that are less fortunate. And it won’t get them out of poverty.

The fiasco on Europe stems in part because people need a scapegoat, and are unwilling to face the truth: the growth we experienced post-WW2 happened because we were rebuilding to our pre-WW2 height, and because we had cheap hydrocarbons. There is also strong evidence to suggest that we have reached an economic state where the major breakthroughs from industrialisation that generated strong growth previously are no longer present.

But people still remember the good times. They remember when they could expect regular payrises and a better future for their children. And they tried to keep it going—through debt. That, unfortunately, is stupid. And dangerous. The hard truth is that people blame Europe because they won’t look themselves in the eye, and realise it’s their own bloody fault. (Other agents such as the banks, the landlords, etc. are far from innocent as well.)

Our final proposition does have some merit, but it is ultimately an attempt to blame Labour and our political system in general, for our own failings in the personal sphere of fiscal responsibility.

Above: private household debt as a percentage of GDP. Source: Touchstone Blog, citing OBR.

Finally! Sequels

Our tedious but hopefully informative foray into the murky realm of political economy over, I’ve got news. Specifically: a tale is a-coming. But it isn’t the one you think.

I’ve mentioned my plans for a sequel to the Necromancer. That would have been called the Deathbringer, and I had many a plan for it. But plans change. My reasons for deciding not to write the sequel now (you may be thankful to know I haven’t written it off for future endeavours) are twofold. Firstly: the Necromancer is not going to be my greatest work. This is not to say that it is bad (how can it? It’s got flying zombies!) but rather that the powers of the imagination have different tales to tell.

This leads me onto my second reason: this is a story I’ve been waiting to tell for some time.

It’s about love. You may not be surprised to learn this, if you’ve followed this blog. Inevitably, the life of a teenager (no matter how intellectually minded or capable) features love—or at least the desire for love. You may be surprised to learn that said lovers are male. But would you really?

I have many other details. It is set in a time of beautiful desperation; a time when space is salvation—and the Earth is but a sweet, decaying tomb. Its name is the Ark; and though much may be said of it—of its bitter, hopeful struggle; of its pain, and its awe and its love—the sweetest tales are those first discovered.

I shall leave you, now. You have much to dwell upon. And, alas, school never was a kind beast…